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THE SOCIALITY OF CHARITABLE GIVING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE

By
Wesley Allen-Arave
B.A., Anthropology, University of Utah
M.Sc., Anthropology, University of New Mexico
Ph.D., Anthropology, University of New Mexico

ABSTRACT

This dissertation draws on an evolutionary perspective to document and
examine the social contexts in which charitable donations and appeals occur to
increase our understanding of the role that social reputation may play in people’s
charitable giving decisions. Charitable giving challenges theorists to contemplate
pathways to cooperation that do not require shared genes, direct reciprocity, or
immediate direct gains. This dissertation investigates the extent to which people
give charitable donations in settings where donations are likely to have
reputational consequences and how social relationships relate to charitable
giving behavior. Data is based on face-to-face interviews with 512 participants
covering the last charitable appeal they saw or heard, the voluntary donations (if
any) they gave to charity over the previous 12 months, and their social support
networks.
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The overall picture that emerges suggests that the benefits of upholding
reputation as a beneficent partner for cooperative relationships plays an
important role in the evolution and maintenance of human personality traits,
sentiments, emotions, and values that encourage charitable giving. Although
impersonal media appeals, appeals made by representatives of nonprofits, and
requests to help strangers in need account for most of the charitable appeals that
recall, people rarely give in response to these commonplace requests that only
put their social reputations with familiar contacts at minimal stake. Most
donations that people give transpire in social settings where familiar social ties
solicit, collect, or are present to potentially witnesses a donors’ contributions.
Donors even often hand over charitable donations to friends and acquaintances
with personal stakes in the cause the donor supports. When people do give
donations that friends and associates are unlikely to discover, the donations are
more likely to involve transfers of unwanted property, purchases of wanted
charity premiums or charity-branded products, entries in games of chance, and
tax subsidies that offset the cost of giving. Still, people who report giving larger
totals in private and anonymous settings after the removal of economic
incentives report having more friends who they believe they can count on in a
time of need. These findings illuminate the role of social reputation in the
richness and breadth of human cooperation.
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CHAPTER 1. AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON
CHARITABLE GIVING

No one has ever become poor by giving
— Anne Frank, Tales in the Secret Annex (translated by Michel Mok)
1.1. Charity demonstrates the striking nature of human cooperation
People across diverse cultures and ecologies surrender resources, labor,
time, and comfort to benefit others. In small-scale subsistence societies, people
assist one another in alloparental care (K. Hill & Hurtado, 2009; Kramer, 2010; A.
E. Page, 2016), food acquisition (Alvard, 2012; K. R. Hill, 2002), food
provisioning (Gurven & Jaeggi, 2015; Kaplan et al., 1984), coalitional support
(Glowacki et al., 2016; Macfarlan et al., 2014), and the acquisition of skills and
knowledge (Henrich & Henrich, 2010). In large-scale market-integrated societies,
people coordinate behaviors in elaborate divisions of labor (Campbell, 1983) and
engage in helping acts that range from small favors for friends (Boster et al.,
1995) to taking life-threatening risks to rescue strangers in peril (Becker & Eagly,
2004). These behaviors contribute to human cooperative patterns that exceed
the scale and range of comparable behaviors in other animal species (Melis &
Semmann, 2010).
The striking nature of human cooperation is evident in the willingness of
people in many market economies to give voluntary donations to charity. In a
couple of dozen countries—Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Cyprus,
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Finland, Italy, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Republic of
Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Zambia—more than a third of the population donates to charity
in a given month. In just as many countries—Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Haiti, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Malta, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America—charitable giving is even more prevalent with over half
of the population donating to charity in a given month (CAF, 2018).
This study draws on the explanatory framework of evolutionary theory to
increase our understanding of why people give donations to charity. For this
study, “charitable donations” designate donors’ voluntary contributions to publicly
funded non-profit organizations that advance the common interests of a broad
segment of society. These common interests can include relief of poverty,
sickness, or misfortune that we often immediately think of as “charity,” as well as
the promotion of arts, culture, humanities, community, religion, education, health,
animals, environment, or public policy. This definition highlights that donors’ gifts
benefit a broad segment of society beyond any single beneficiary who a donor
may have an interest in helping. This definition of “charitable donations” excludes
gifts that people give to specific individuals and families such as money given
directly to a panhandler, a contribution to a crowdfunding campaign to help one
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individual with medical bills, or a gift to help one family struggling in the wake of a
tragedy. However, this definition does include donations collected by advocates
with personal stakes in causes who collect donations from donors on behalf of
nonprofits. Such collections may occur in fundraising campaigns that recruit the
beneficiaries of a nonprofit’s services to go out and solicit charitable donations for
the nonprofit. In these cases, donors’ contributions ultimately go to nonprofit
organizations that benefit many stakeholders rather than being retained for the
exclusive personal benefit of the stakeholder who collects the donor’s
contribution.
1.2. The extent of charitable giving in the United States
Estimates of annual expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX 2013–2018) show that households in the United States spend considerable
amounts on charity. The CEX likely offers a conservative estimate of charitable
giving since the survey only cues respondents to recall cash contributions to the
four broad categories of religious organizations, educational institutions, political
organizations, and “other” charities. When cued by categories of giving, rather
than by methods that people use to give (such as “in response to a request
through the mail” or “by sponsoring someone in a charity event”), respondents
often report any significant, planned gifts they gave throughout the year.
However, they do not always recall smaller, unplanned donations they may have
given through the year that can add up (Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2004;
Wilhelm 2007). Further, respondents may omit contributions to causes that they
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do not immediately think of as “charity” that do not have explicit cues in the CEX.
These may include donations for performing arts organizations, historical
societies, museums, libraries, youth extracurricular activities, civil rights causes,
environmental causes, or public policy research. Additionally, by specifically
asking respondents to recall “cash contributions,” some respondents may omit
donations made by check, credit card, or payroll deduction. Although estimates
from the CEX likely represent a lower bound on amounts that households
transfer to charity, some households do not ultimately bear the full cost of their
donations. U.S. tax code before 2019 allowed generous tax reductions for
households that deducted designated charitable contributions. Households that
itemize deductions, usually with the primary purpose of deducting large
mortgages or medical expenses, effectively pay only (1 – m) for every eligible
claimed dollar given to charity, where m is the household’s marginal tax rate.
Although imperfect, estimates from the CEX (see Table 1.1, below) place annual
expenditures per household on charity within a few hundred dollars of annual
expenditures per household on education and electricity. As seen in Table 1.1
(below), household spending on charity rivals or exceeds household spending on
cellular phone service, internet and streaming services, cable and satellite
television services, vehicle maintenance and repairs, car insurance, out-ofpocket spending on prescription medications and over-the-counter drugs,
personal care products and services, pets, and alcoholic beverages.
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Table 1.1. Estimated average annual expenditure per household, Consumer
Expenditure Survey
Item

2015

2016

2017

2018

128,437

129,549

130,001

131,439

$55,978.46
100.00%

$57,311.14
100.00%

$60,059.55
100.00%

$61,224.13
100.00%

$1,040.58
1.86%

$1,224.55
2.14%

$1,084.95
1.81%

$1,090.68
1.78%

$783.83

$747.32

$764.55

$789.21

$36.47

$61.38

$35.15

$40.26

$7.72

$19.26

$8.68

$19.02

$212.56

$396.59

$276.57

$242.19

$1,314.65
2.35%

$1,328.71
2.32%

$1,490.94
2.48%

$1,407.08
2.30%

$1,459.98

$1,443.81

$1,419.62

$1,496.14

2.61%

2.52%

2.36%

2.44%

$1,022.85
1.83%

$1,123.69
1.96%

$1,117.91
1.86%

$1,187.85
1.94%

$446.34
0.80%

$481.98
0.84%

$534.51
0.89%

$584.24
0.95%

$754.26
1.35%

$764.45
1.33%

$637.56
1.06%

$672.14
1.10%

$836.77
1.49%

$849.04
1.48%

$954.26
1.59%

$889.79
1.45%

$1,078.56
1.93%

$1,149.12
2.01%

$966.53
1.61%

$976.21
1.59%
(continued)

Number of consumer units (in thousands)
Average annual expenditures
Mean
Share
Cash contributions to non-profit organizations1
Mean
Share
Church and religious organizations
Mean
Educational institutions
Mean
Political organizations
Mean
Charities and other organizations
Mean
Education1
Mean
Share
Electricity
Mean
Share
Cellular phone service
Mean
Share
Internet and streaming services2
Mean
Share
Cable and satellite television services
Mean
Share
Vehicle maintenance and repairs3
Mean
Share
Vehicle insurance
Mean
Share
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Table 1.2 (continued). Estimated average annual expenditure per household,
Consumer Expenditure Survey
Item

Prescriptions and over the counter
drugs4
Mean
Share
Personal care products and services5
Mean
Share
Pets6
Mean
Share
Alcoholic beverages
Mean
Share

2015

2016

2017

2018

$521.81

$567.96

$590.94

$587.67

0.93%

0.99%

0.98%

0.96%

$682.56

$706.71

$762.10

$768.16

1.22%

1.23%

1.27%

1.25%

$528.17
0.94%

$583.26
1.02%

$709.73
1.18%

$662.38
1.08%

$515.11
0.92%

$483.92
0.84%

$558.08
0.93%

$582.80
0.95%

Table adapted from detailed annual expenditure means tables for all consumer units, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US
Department of Labor
1
Money given by cash, checks, money orders, or credit cards to benefit educational institutions, political organizations,
religious organizations (including churches, temples, and mosques), and charities or other organizations
2
College, elementary school, high school, and vocational or technical school expenses (including tuition; finance, late,
interest charges for student loans; test preparation and tutoring services; rentals; books, supplies, and equipment)
3
Internet service provider services, music streaming services, and video streaming services
4
Routine servicing (including coolant, brake fluid, transmission fluid, and other additives; motor tune-up; lube, oil
change, and oil filters; front-end alignment; wheel balance, and rotation); Wear items (including tires - purchased,
replaced, installed; parts, equipment, and accessories; vehicle products and cleaning services; repairs (bodywork
and painting; vehicle or engine repairs; replacement parts; tire repairs); and auto repair service policies
5
Prescription medications, over the counter drugs, drug insurance, and drug insurance premiums
6
Hair care products; wigs and hairpieces; oral hygiene products; shaving needs; cosmetics; perfume; bath
preparations; deodorants; feminine hygiene products; personal care appliances; personal care services such as
haircuts; and repair of personal care appliances
7
Pet food and supplies; pet purchases; pet services such as grooming; vet services and medicines

The extent of household expenditures on charity reflects the degree to
which private donors in the United States provide vital support for a wide range of
public interests (see Table 1.3 below). Donors support public interests in their
local communities, such as libraries, animal shelters, homeless shelters, food
pantries, local volunteer emergency medical services, and youth activities, as
well as global interests such as wildlife protection, environmental conservation,
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Table 1.3. Categories of causes that people sometimes contribute money or
other property to for charitable purposes
A. Animals
(humane societies, shelters, veterinary services, zoos and aquariums)

B. Arts, culture, and humanities
(museums, visual and performing art groups, culture activities, libraries, historical societies)

C. Education
(tutoring, alumni organizations, scholarships, early childhood services, youth education, adult
education, special education)

D. Environment
(nature centers, conservation, habitat and wildlife protection)

E. Community development and community services
(crime prevention services, housing and neighborhood development)

F. Health organizations
(hospitals, patient treatments, nursing homes, emergency services, health education, mental
health services, services for specific diseases)

G. Human and civil rights
(advocacy and education)

H. Human services
(helping those in need of food / shelter / goods, family services, senior and women’s services,
local emergency medical services)

I. International and foreign aid
(economic development, humanitarian relief, peace advocacy)

J. Political organizations or campaigns
K. Private and community foundations
L. Public and society benefit
(public radio, public television)

M. Work related organizations
N. Religious organizations
(churches, synagogues, mosques, missionary societies, tithing)

O. Research and public policy
(medical research, scientific research, government accountability, policy issue education)

P. Youth activities
(recreation clubs, school clubs, sports teams)

Q. Other
R. None of the above

and medical research. Donors contribute to public goods they utilize themselves,
including performing arts, museums, public media, political causes, and religious
activities, and support the welfare of strangers through humanitarian relief and

7

international development. Donors typically value the public goods they support,
but this alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for why donors give. After
all, an individual donor’s personal contributions rarely have enough impact on
their own to transform the overall level of services that transpire. Meanwhile,
sympathizers of a cause can usually stand aside, keeping their personal
resources for themselves, while others collectively pay enough to supply the
common good.
1.3. Levels of explanation: Proximate mechanisms and adaptive functions
Human cooperation has captured the interest of scholars in the social and
behavioral sciences going back to Adam Smith (1759), Durkheim (1893), and
Mauss (1923). Social and behavioral scientists customarily attend to the
immediate cognitive, neural, and physiological experiences that trigger
behaviors. Social scientists studying cooperation note that people assist others
because they feel empathetic concern for others (Batson & Shaw, 1991) and
experience “warm glow” feelings by helping (Andreoni, 1990). Implicating “warm
glow” feelings in charitable giving, neurological studies reveal that charitable
giving activates the brain’s reward systems (Aknin et al., 2013; Harbaugh et al.,
2007; Moll et al., 2006). Social scientists also note that people give charitable
contributions to avoid negative emotions associated with anticipatory guilt (Basil
et al., 2008) and social pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Reyniers & Bhalla,
2013).
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The presence of these proximate mechanisms, however, does not explain
why people experience cognitions, concerns, and emotions that motivate them to
help others and to contribute to public goods. The proximate cognitive, neural,
and physiological mechanisms that underlie behavior are products of
evolutionary processes that hold the key to explaining why behaviors originate
and become common (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963). Over multiple generations,
natural selection increases traits—including behaviors—that are better suited to
the environment in terms of survival and reproduction relative to traits that are not
as well suited to the environment. In this way, behaviors that serve beneficial
adaptive functions become common in a population. Given that helping
behaviors entail costs, natural selection should only maintain helping behaviors if
they provide (or are bound to other traits that provide) helpers with long-term
benefits that, on balance, exceed the costs of helping. The breadth, scale, and
intensity of human cooperative behaviors indicate that helping in some
circumstances has been linked, on average and over several generations, to
favorable outcomes for helpers.
However, evolutionary theory does not predict that people will always help
or that all people will help in the same circumstances. Evolved cognitive, neural,
and physiological mechanisms can generate considerable variation in social
behavior (E. A. Smith, 2011). Variation may arise from conditional strategies that
permit people to adjust their behavior to suit variable conditions and from
coexisting alternative strategies that lead different people to different behavioral

9

responses to identical social and natural environments. The former occurs when
phenotypic plasticity enables individuals to flexibly pursue different courses of
action contingent on their current states and on current socio-ecological
conditions that affect the costs and benefits of their available options (Dawkins,
1980; Gross, 1996; Tomkins & Hazel, 2007). The latter occurs when alternative
behavioral strategies evolve because no one behavioral strategy outperforms all
others (McGill & Brown, 2007; Sigmund & Nowak, 1999; J. M. Smith, 1982).
Alternative behavioral strategies may manifest as persistent personality
differences. The result is that people, in general, should be more willing to help in
socio-ecological conditions that increase the benefits and decrease the costs of
helping. But, across socio-ecological conditions, some people may be more
prone than others to help.
This dissertation draws on an evolutionary perspective to advance our
understanding of the adaptive functions behind charitable giving behavior. This
evolutionary perspective is not a suggestion that natural selection explicitly
occurred for charitable giving. Instead, charitable giving likely results from
people’s evolved propensities to expend resources and effort in general to
benefit others and to provision public goods in socio-ecological settings where
helpers through time have repeatedly realized fitness-correlated payoffs.
Although charitable giving is an evolutionary novel phenomenon, humans have a
long and entrenched evolutionary history of assessing tradeoffs involving social
obligations and potential contributions of food, tools, implements, materials,
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effort, or service to enhance the welfare of others. This history, combined with
relatively large brains capable of complex cognitive tasks and the human facility
to acquire complex cultural norms, equips people to process cues of the costs
and benefits of giving or withholding assistance in general. This ability informs
people’s decisions regarding charitable donations, allowing people to respond
adaptively to trade-offs associated with giving and not giving charitable donations
in different socio-ecological settings. Still, relatively cooperative and relatively
selfish alternative behavioral strategies may coexist such that some people are
more inclined than others to experience or respond to cognitive and physiological
triggers that encourage charitable giving in some circumstances. Identification of
the precise proximate motivations, emotions, and cognitions that prompt people’s
adaptive responses and personality differences in overall generosity falls beyond
the scope of this dissertation. Still, I do refer to proximate mechanisms in general
terms when discussing people’s motivations since people experience these
proximate mechanisms and do not consciously intend to enact the adaptive
functions of their behaviors.
1.4. Indirect fitness benefits, reciprocity, and by-product mutualism
Indirect fitness benefits, reciprocity, and by-product mutualism provide
coherent explanations for the evolution of many cooperative behaviors found in
nature. Cooperation among close relatives may evolve with comparative ease
since helpers receive indirect fitness benefits if they aid collateral relatives who
share identical copies of rare alleles by descent (Maynard Smith, 1964). Natural
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selection can favor such nepotistic altruism if the benefit to an assisted relative,
discounted by the coefficient of genetic relatedness, exceeds the cost of help for
the helper (Hamilton, 1964). Reciprocity provides an incentive for helpers to incur
short-term costs to benefit dyadic partners who provide long-term net benefits
through return favors (Trivers, 1971). Natural selection can favor reciprocity if the
cost of aiding another individual is outweighed by the benefit of receiving aid from
that individual later, devalued by the probability that assistance will be returned
(Boyd, 1992; Noë, 1990). If both partners obtain net benefits over the long run
through reciprocal exchanges, both partners should willingly provide help to
continue reaping the personal benefits that accrue over time. Finally, by-product
mutualism describes cases where individuals serving their immediate selfinterests produce goods that also benefit others (J. L. Brown, 1983; Connor,
1995; West-Eberhard, 1975). In this case, common goods are furnished by
providers who reap personal benefits from the goods they produce that exceed
the costs of providing the goods. Although providers receive a net benefit, byproduct mutualism can involve a collective action dilemma if free-riders can gain
an advantage over providers by collecting benefits without paying costs to
provide benefits themselves (M. Olson, 1971).
One sweeping adaptive function is unlikely to explain the full suite of human
cooperative behaviors. Instead, different pathways to cooperation underlie
different cooperative acts in different circumstances. Likewise, people may give
charitable donations for any of the same reasons that they provide any other
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goods and services to others. Indirect fitness benefits, reciprocity, and by-product
mutualism can each encourage charitable donation behavior in the right
conditions. Emotions that encourage investments in indirect fitness may prompt a
grandmother to buy cookies to support her granddaughter’s Girl Scout cookie
fundraiser. A participant running in a charity run on behalf of a favorite cause
may be sponsored by a close friend who is motivated by sentiments that promote
assisting a reciprocal helping partner. A concerned community member might
support a fund drive for a local youth activity center in hopes of curbing disruptive
gang activities in the neighborhood that threaten the donor’s immediate sense of
security. Yet, many charitable donations do not involve close relatives, dyadic
exchange partners, or immediate personal gains.
1.5. Generalized helping
People assist one another in many ways that models of indirect fitness
benefits, reciprocity, and by-product mutualism do not resolve. In small-scale
subsistence societies, neighbors construct and maintain village commons,
community members prepare public feasts, foragers clear trails for everyone who
will come behind them, and hunters pursue resources that are shared equally
with all other band members. In large-scale societies, people hold doors for those
behind them, commuters give up their seats for elders, pedestrians give money
to panhandlers, diners leave tips at restaurants they do not frequent, people turn
found valuables over to lost and found repositories, drivers stop to help stranded
motorists on the side of the road, Secret Santas shop for holiday gifts from giving
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trees for less fortunate families, and whistleblowers risk their livelihoods to
protect the general public. Experiments in societies throughout the world
demonstrate that some people pay costs to provide benefits to non-kin in settings
where recipients are unlikely to return the favor directly. In several small-scale
foraging, herding, horticultural, and agricultural societies, some participants in
economics experiments share windfall earnings with members of their
communities even in anonymous conditions (Henrich et al., 2001). Similarly,
experiments in large-scale globalized societies find that some participants
willingly hand a portion of study earnings over to strangers (Raihani & Bshary,
2015), and most people immediately help unfamiliar victims in clear emergencies
(Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Nida, 1981).
Some charitable donations provide unambiguous examples of the more
generalized form of helping that people sometimes engage in. Charitable giving
presents a particularly challenging form of aid-giving for models of self-interest to
account for because beneficiaries and benefactors have no direct interaction
when donations are relayed through intermediary charitable organizations.
Donors cannot expect recompensation from beneficiaries when neither party
knows the identity of the other, nor can many donors anticipate preferred
treatment if they should ever need the services of the charity they support. For
example, donors who give to the Red Cross in the wake of a natural disaster do
not expect victims to come forward feeling personally indebted to them. These
donors also do not anticipate that their donation will entice the Red Cross to take
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an interest in the donor’s personal welfare above the welfare of anyone else if a
natural disaster should ever strike the donor’s region. Many donations also
involve causes that do not have a bearing on the personal welfare of donors and
that donors do not anticipate ever needing themselves. For example, people with
full refrigerators give donations to feed impoverished strangers, heterosexual
couples contribute to organizations that promote lesbian and gay rights, and
urbanites who do not like “roughing it” give to protect rugged habitats they will
never visit. Such generosity challenges theorists to contemplate pathways to
cooperation that do not require shared genes, direct reciprocity, or immediate
direct gains.
1.6. Social standing
Helpers who provide assistance to others beyond the confines of kinship
ties and repeated dyadic exchanges might obtain prestige or social support by
earning the esteem or trust of their associates (Alexander, 1987; Boone, 1998;
Frank, 1988; Gurven et al., 2000; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nesse, 2007;
Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Roberts, 1998; Trivers,
1971; Zahavi, 1995). People track one another’s actions and form beliefs
regarding one another’s intentions in ways that perhaps even our closest primate
relatives do not (Tomasello et al., 2005). Human language allows people to
gather information about one another’s behavior not only through direct personal
interactions and first-hand observations, but also by attending to gossip about
one another’s actions more broadly (Alexander, 1987; Feinberg et al., 2014;
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Piazza & Bering, 2008; E. A. Smith, 2010; R. D Sommerfeld et al., 2008; Trivers,
1971). Good deeds can lead others to view and discuss providers in a better
light, while selfish deeds can lead others to view and discuss egoists in a worse
light. The assessments that people make regarding one another’s status and
goodwill play important roles in how people behave toward one another. In this
way, the short-term costs of helping others who are unlikely to pay back
assistance can pale in comparison to the potential long-term reputational
repercussions of being identified as someone who delivers (or withholds)
assistance.
Charitable donations are one way that people might enhance their standing
with peers. Many lines of evidence indicate that people take satisfaction from
leaving good impressions on others by giving to charity. Anecdotally, I have
found that if my interest in charitable giving comes up in conversations with new
acquaintances, they often use the opportunity to mention donations they have
made. At the end of academic presentations of my research, colleagues often
ask public questions that begin with them disclosing contributions they have
made to their favorite causes. Less subjectively, donors are known to display
pins, rubber wristbands, tote bags, stickers, and empathy ribbons that overtly
reveal their support of a cause (Grace & Griffin, 2006; West, 2004). When
charities publish donor names, donors commonly give the lowest amount
required to fall within a publicized donor category, suggesting that donors value
having their identity as a donor known but do not seek to provide any more than
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necessary to receive recognition (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998b). In
economics experiments, participants increase their charitable contributions as
privacy decreases (Alpizar et al., 2008; Basil et al., 2006; Böhm & Regner, 2013;
List et al., 2004; Reinstein & Riener, 2012; Reyniers & Bhalla, 2013; Soetevent,
2005). Further, participants in economics experiments who have an opportunity
to donate to charity while they believe others are watching experience activation
of brain regions associated with the “reward system” (Izuma et al., 2010). People
also leave more change for charitable causes in collection containers and return
more in donation envelopes when simple images depicting eyes are present on
or near requests (Ekström, 2012; Kelsey et al., 2018; Krupka & Croson, 2016;
Oda & Ichihashi, 2016; Powell et al., 2012). Such susceptibility to eye images
suggests that potential donors respond subconsciously to even very subtle cues
of being watched (see Haley & Fessler, 2005). People who gain recognition for
generosity may benefit by earning the esteem or trust of their peers.
1.6.1. Signaling and social prestige
People generally seek social prestige, which confers benefits such as
increased subjective well-being, self-esteem, mental health, and physical health
(Anderson et al., 2015). One way to command social prestige may be by
provisioning others (Boone, 1998; Zahavi, 1995). Much like conspicuous
consumption, the ability of a provider to sustain the expense of public
provisioning can directly indicate the provider’s ability to command resources
(Gintis et al., 2001). Through displays of resource holding power, a provider may
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gain social influence over peers (Boone, 1998) or receive deference from
potential challengers (Zahavi, 1995). Those who benefit from a provider’s
contributions may also confer status upon a provider to encourage further
prospective contributions (Alexander 1987).
Large public donations to charity are one avenue by which an affluent
status seeker might obtain social prestige. Boone (1998) identifies philanthropy
as an example of the type of display that privileged people can make to reinforce
their social status. Scholars focused on philanthropy similarly posit that affluent
donors give large public donations to mark their social position (Harbaugh,
1998b; Ostrower, 1997) or to attract attention from peers who seek to socialize
with high-status associates (Glazer & Konrad, 1996). Consistent with statusseeking explanations for philanthropy, very wealthy households tend to give
either very substantial donations or very meager donations in any given year,
suggesting that affluent donors prefer to save up in some years to facilitate more
substantial donations in other years (Andreoni, 2006). Wealthy donors typically
use their considerable gifts to support institutions such as museums,
symphonies, operas, hospitals, business schools, and law schools that announce
large donor gifts in a very public manner with printed materials, plaques, or even
by bestowing a donor’s name on a prominent building (Harbaugh, 1998a). In line
with status garnering donors valuable social influence, participants in
experiments who give more of a windfall endowment to charity receive more
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votes from other participants as a representative for the group (Milinski et al.,
2002a).
Status signaling provides a compelling explanation for wealthy donors’ large
public gifts but may have limited applicability for explaining typical donations of
smaller amounts that do not garner public attention. Gifts need to be beyond the
means of what an ordinary person can provide to substantiate a donor’s superior
resource holding power. Given this cost, a donation must reach the
consciousness of a sufficiently large number of onlookers to be worthwhile.
Substantial contributions bestowed on charities that publicly recognize the
identities of donors provide an effective way to mark status. Yet, many day-today donations are not announced publicly and involve more modest sums that
are within the means of a typical person.
1.6.2. Cooperative reputation
Generosity may also enhance a helper’s appeal as a partner for fruitful
friendships, alliances, and collaborations (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Frank,
1988; Gurven et al., 2000; Nesse, 2007; Roberts, 1998; Sugden, 2005). Indirect
reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund,
1998; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004) extends the concept of reciprocity (Trivers,
1971) to recognize that helpers can receive return benefits from others who were
not themselves beneficiaries of the helper’s initial generosity. Natural selection
can favor indirect reciprocity if the short-term costs of helping recipients who do
not return aid are offset by an increased likelihood of obtaining more substantial
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benefits as a recipient of assistance from other helpers (Panchanathan & Boyd,
2004). Indirect reciprocity entails reputation with people conditioning their
behavior toward one another on assessments of one another’s goodwill toward
third parties.
People may readily offer more assistance to associates who help third
parties since people gain by fostering friendships, alliances, and collaborations
with generous partners who provide benefits (Barclay, 2013; Chiang, 2010).
Given human capacities for language and technology, friends, allies, and
collaborators provide vital goods and services as diverse as social and emotional
support, knowledge, special skills, mentoring, resources, tools, manufactured
goods, labor, childcare, shelter, protection, and employment prospects.
Generosity extended to those who cannot or will not return assistance can further
a helper’s ability to establish and maintain these valuable social relationships by
indicating a provider’s likely beneficence as a social partner in two key ways.
First, by successfully sustaining the costs inherent in expending resources or
effort without any immediate compensation, providers demonstrate their
capability and effectiveness at bestowing benefits on others (Boone, 1998; Gintis
et al., 2001; Roberts, 1998; Zahavi, 1995). Second, by revealing a social
preference (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013) or emotional commitment (Frank, 1988;
Hirschleifer, 1987) to routinely help others even in the absence of any assured
return benefit, helpers demonstrate their credibility and steadfastness in
providing assistance. As Alexander (1987, p. 119) points out, interested
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audiences may view helpers as “one to whom help can be given with little fear of
being short-changed.”
Biological market theory (Barclay, 2013; Noë & Hammerstein, 1995) draws
attention to the fact that individuals may gain regard as beneficent cooperative
partners only to the degree that they bestow more benefits on their (potential)
partners than their peers. Indiscriminate generosity might escalate if people
compete to gain reputations for more exceptional generosity than their peers
(Boone, 1998; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Roberts, 1998) or if partner choice leads
to a process of runaway social selection (Flinn & Alexander, 2007; Nesse, 2007).
At the other extreme, individuals who get stigmatized as moochers or cheaters
may have trouble finding trusting collaborators and exchange partners
(Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010; Masclet, 2003). Such
stigma can also bring wider ostracism or punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002;
Feinberg et al., 2014; Henrich et al., 2006; Krasnow et al., 2015; Mathew & Boyd,
2011).
In economies where discretionary income is common, charitable donations
(or refusals) that associates solicit, observe, or learn about may enhance (or
damage) a potential donor’s reputation as a beneficent social partner. Alexander
(1985, footnote 4), Frank (1988), Fehrler and Przepiorka (2013), and Roberts
(1998) point to charitable donations as the type of generosity that theories of
reputation-based indirect reciprocity capture. Consistent with this, several
economics experiments find that participants place more trust in and give more
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generously to partners who publicly donate a portion of their study earnings to
charity (Albert et al., 2007; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Milinski et al., 2002b).
1.7. Multi-level selection
Theories of norm internalization (Gavrilets & Richerson, 2017; Gintis, 2003),
group selection (Wilson & Sober, 1994; Wilson & Wilson, 2007), and cultural
evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Fehr et al., 2002; Henrich, 2004) posit that
payoffs to individual cooperators cannot, by themselves, account for the scale,
breadth, and intensity of cooperative behaviors found in human societies. Sober
and Wilson (Sober & Wilson, 1998) point to charitable giving as a behavior that
individual-level selection cannot explain. Yet, even if internalized norms, group
selection, or cultural evolution play a significant role in shaping the immediate
emotional, cognitive, or physiological mechanisms that encourage people to give
charitable donations, individual incentives will still factor into people’s giving
decisions. I take a perspective of methodological individualism in this dissertation
to see how far it can take us in explaining charitable giving behavior.
1.8. Significance of the dissertation and survey methodology
While sociodemographic characteristics of donors are well studied
(Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Wiepking & Bekkers, 2012), situational contexts of
donations and donation requests have received much less attention. Yet,
individual charitable giving decisions are likely context-dependent. We stand to
learn a great deal about why people give to charity by investigating the social
contexts that promote and moderate people’s giving impulses. Meanwhile,
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experiments investigating the role of reputation in charitable giving decisions
(and cooperation more generally) typically involve participants facing forced
allocation decisions using windfall earnings in artificial interactions with strangers.
These experiments allow us to draw invaluable causal inferences by isolating
single factors of interest, but findings from these experiments may have limited
applicability to the behaviors found outside the lab that we ultimately seek to
explain (Gurven & Winking, 2008; Levitt & List, 2007; Tognetti et al., 2012;
Winking & Mizer, 2013).
Some people may actively seek out opportunities to give charitable
donations, while others may inconspicuously ignore or avoid potential giving
situations (Andreoni et al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Trachtman et al., 2015).
The forced allocation decisions of experiments may not capture how people
engage with or avoid actual giving decisions and opportunities. Real-life
donations and requests involve decisions to expend or withhold resources that
(potential) donors will often have budgeted for charity beforehand or will have
already intended to spend on something else. People may allocate funds from
their regular budgets differently than they allocate windfall earnings that they
receive as part of an experiment. Real-life donation opportunities can occur at
home and in other private spaces where others (including experimenters who
actively record actions) do not observe (potential) donors at the critical moment
when they choose to give (or withhold) a gift. Donations and requests can also
occur during neighborly visits, at work, during professional or social organization
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meetings, at religious services, or in public spaces where (potential) donors
interact with friends, neighbors, co-workers, or acquaintances. Reputation and
long-range considerations may be very pertinent in interactions with friends,
neighbors, coworkers, or acquaintances, but not in interactions with strangers in
a lab. Indeed, building a reputation to impress strangers for short-term
interactions makes no more strategic sense than directly cooperating with
strangers in short-term interactions.
To investigate how well promising theoretical works of reputation-based
generosity accord with real-world charitable giving patterns, this dissertation
documents and analyzes the social contexts in which donation appeals and
donations naturally occur. This focus necessarily relies on respondents’ selfreports of their donations and the requests they encounter. Participant recall
error or outright dishonesty can bias self-report data, and so we must take
caution with the results of this research. However, survey data is the best way to
understand people’s overall charitable giving behaviors involving expenditures
(or withholdings) of their regular resources that result, in part, from their
willingness to seek out or avoid opportunities to give. The survey methodology
used in this study provides measures of donations and requests that occur in
private contexts that cannot be easily observed directly as well as those that
occur in the course of long-term social relationships that are difficult to implement
and control in laboratory settings. The degree to which charitable donations
occur in anonymous, private settings and the degree to which charitable
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donations occur in social settings where familiar social ties are likely to discover
a donor’s generosity hold important implications for the role of social reputation in
charitable giving behavior. Additionally, this research seeks to determine whether
experimental findings that more generous individuals receive more social support
hold outside of artificial laboratory settings. To fully understand the factors that
promote and moderate charitable giving, we need both survey studies and
careful experiments with each study type complementing the knowledge of the
other.
This dissertation draws on data I collected through face-to-face interviews
with residents of 512 households in the greater Albuquerque / Rio Rancho, NM
metropolitan area from September 15, 2004 through October 13, 2005. To obtain
a broad cross-section of respondents, I recruited participants from New Mexico
State Motor Division (MVD) field office waiting rooms in Albuquerque, NM and
Rio Rancho, NM. Most New Mexicans maintain a driver’s license or a state ID
(which non-drivers use to enter clubs and bars, purchase alcohol and tobacco
products, open bank accounts, and to write and cash checks). At the time of the
interviews, driver’s licenses and state IDs required in-person renewal every four
years and were the primary reason people went to an MVD field office. I selected
participants randomly by approaching every person who took a number from an
automatic ticket dispenser to see an MVD clerk anytime I was not already
engaged with another (potential) study participant. To compensate participants
for their time and to increase participation rates of less generous individuals who
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might be less eager to give time to a researcher and less likely to give charitable
contributions, I offered participants $20 (2005 dollars) in immediate cash upon
completing an interview and questionnaire.
Interested individuals read and signed a consent form to participate. To
take part, individuals had to be at least 18 years old. Interviews with respondents
who gave no donations or only made a few contributions to a few causes
typically took 20 to 40 minutes to complete. Interviews with respondents who
gave many donations to many different causes sometimes took a couple of hours
to complete. Individuals who agreed to participate are broadly representative of
the diverse populations of Albuquerque, NM and Rio Rancho, NM (see Table
1.4, below). However, participants who are under 50 and participants who
identify as non-Hispanic White are oversampled at the expense of individuals
who are aged 60 and above and individuals who identify either as Asian or as an
ethnicity not included in the census. The sample population also tends to earn
less income, to be more likely to have a high school degree, and to be less likely
to have a bachelor’s degree than the residents of Albuquerque, NM and Rio
Racho, NM overall.
Interviews covered the last charitable appeal that respondents could recall
encountering (detailed in Chapter 2), charitable donations respondents made
over the previous 12 months (if any) (detailed in Chapter 3), and the social
support networks of household members (detailed in Chapter 4). The overall
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Table 1.4. Demographics of the study population
2010 census,
Albuquerque
51.4

2010 census,
Rio Rancho
51.3

Study
sample
51.38

African American alone

3.3

2.9

3.37

Native American alone

4.6

3.2

3.76

Asian alone

2.6

1.9

0.99

Pacific Islander alone

0.1

0.2

0.0

Some other race

15.0

11.1

0.4

Female

Two or more races

4.6

4.7

2.57

Hispanic or Latino, any race

42.4

33.1

33.5

White alone, not Hispanic

42.1

53.8

56.24

87.1 ± 0.5

93.4 ± 0.9

94.63

32.2 ± 0.6

28.2 ± 1.4

26.84

46662 ± 655

59063 ± 2,167

41869

61805 ± 709

70925 ± 2,909

58063

20.79

15.98

23.17

30 - 39

17.9

19.34

19.41

40 - 49

17.47

20.6

27.13

50 - 59

17.12

18.55

16.63

60 – 69

11.84

11.98

7.52

70 +

11.03

10.07

4.95

38.1 ± 0.6, 31.2 ± 0.6

36.5 ± 4.1, 26.4 ± 3.3

22.8, 20.5

46.6 ± 0.8, 43.0 ± 0.7

45.6 ± 4.3, 40.1 ± 5.0

52.4, 47.1

1.6 ± 0.2, 1.9 ± 0.2

2.5 ± 1.4, ± 1.3

2.4, 1.9

2.2 ± 0.2, 8.1 ± 0.3

3.8 ± 1.6, 14.5 ± 5.1

0.0, 6.9

11.5 ± 0.6, 15.9 ± 0.5

11.7 ± 2.6, 16.5 ± 2.6

10.6, 13.5

High school graduate or higher, aged
25+
Bachelor's degree or higher, aged
25+
Median household income (2010
dollars)
Mean household income (2010
dollars)
20 - 29

Never married (m, f)

2

Now married, except seperated (m,
f)2
Seperated (m, f)2
Widowed (m, f)2
Divorced (m, f)
1
2

2

Census data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey
Census data is for individuals aged 15 and above while the study sample is limited to participants aged
18 and above

picture that emerges suggests that the benefits of maintaining a reputation as a
beneficient partner for cooperative relationships play an important role in the
evolution and maintenance of human personality traits, sentiments, emotions,
and values that encourage charitable giving.
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1.9. Overview of the dissertation
The chapters that follow are written to stand alone. Some background
theory accordingly repeats through chapters. This structure allows a reader with
an interest in a specific aspect of this research to skip to the relevant chapter. I
hope a reader with an interest in reading all the chapters will allow their
enthusiasm for an evolutionary perspective on charitable giving to carry them
through some repetition of key concepts.
Chapter 2 explores charitable appeals. Donors usually give in response to
appeals for donations. Given the importance of solicitations in mobilizing donors,
we stand to learn a great deal about why people give to charity by investigating
the factors that promote and inhibit the success of charitable donation appeals.
Chapter 2 focuses on the social contexts that influence single giving decisions
that participants made in response to the last charitable donation appeal they
saw or heard. Although impersonal media appeals and requests from strangers
account for the majority of appeals that respondents report seeing or hearing,
these commonplace requests only put a potential donor’s social reputation with
familiar contacts at minimal stake and only elicit occasional donations. Charitable
donation requests are far more successful in social contexts that heighten the
reputational stakes of a decision to give (or not). Such social contexts include a
social tie between a requester and a potential donor, a requester putting a
respondent on the spot to provide an explicit refusal or excuse if no gift is given,
a requester with a personal stake in a cause soliciting the donation, and an
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appeal on behalf of beneficiaries who benefit greatly from aid. The likelihood of a
donation is highest in social settings where a potential donor’s receptivity to a
charitable appeal has the greatest potential to foster or stifle an existing social
relationship. This occurs when a potential donor receives an appeal from a
familiar social tie who has a personal stake in the cause or from a familiar social
tie who presses the potential donor for an overt response to the request. The size
of an audience to a potential donor’s giving decision, whether comprised of
strangers or familiar associates, does not affect the probability of a donation.
Overall, these results suggest that people give to charity when not giving could
make them look bad to current and potential interaction partners more so than
people welcome opportunities to display generosity competitively.
The decisions that people make in response to individual solicitations, as
examined in Chapter 2, shape the larger giving patterns that emerge over time,
which are the focus of Error! Reference source not found.. Evolutionary theory
suggests that social reputation can play a prominent role in promoting charitable
giving (Alexander, 1985; Boone, 1998; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Frank, 1988;
Roberts, 1998). Yet, we do not know how well these theories pertain to real-life
charitable giving because the social contexts in which donors give their
contributions remain largely undocumented. For reputation to play a prominent
role in charitable giving, donations must occur in social settings where others
who interact with a donor on a regular enough basis for a donor to benefit from
their esteem or trust collect or witness the donations. In Error! Reference source
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not found., I present calculations of the gross amounts that households transfer
to charity and estimate amounts that households expend on charity (after
removing purchases of premiums and “thank-you” gifts, entries in drawings for
valuable prizes, tax breaks, and transfers of unwanted property) for five
categories of giving—all donations, kin support, social relationship investment,
social giving, and extra-network giving. The difference between transfer amounts
and expenditure amounts by category indicates that economic motives account
for more giving that occurs without the involvement of social ties and account for
less of the giving that occurs with the involvement of social ties. In total, over
80% of the dollars the median household expends on charity are given in social
settings where friends or acquaintances of the donor are present and may detect
the contribution. Such social settings include social gatherings, neighborly visits,
religious services, workplace fund drives, and club meetings. The extent to which
giving occurs in social settings where familiar associates request, collect, or are
present to observe a donor’s contributions suggests a significant role for social
reputation in encouraging donors to contribute.
Further, a median of 18.09% of the dollars that households expend on
charity constitute “social relationship investments” where donors give in response
to appeals from friends and acquaintances with personal stakes in the supported
causes. Few households provide kin support by supporting relatives with
personal stakes in a cause. Still, as predicted by inclusive-fitness theory,
decision-makers in households that do transfer resources to nonprofits in support
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of relatives with personal stakes in a cause are significantly older than decisionmakers in households that do not give to nonprofits that benefit relatives. In total,
much charitable giving is embedded in social relationships and is more like other
exchanges that commonly occur among familiar associates than is often
recognized.
A portion of giving occurs in settings where familiar associates do not
solicit, collect, or observe the contribution. Over a quarter of households that
make any charitable expenditure over the course of a year expend the larger
portion of their contribution dollars in social settings where friends and
acquaintances are unlikely to gain first-hand knowledge of the contribution.
Chapter 4 explores whether individuals attract more social support when they
have traits that encourage them to assist others even when reputational benefits
are unlikely. A reputation as a capable and willing helper—or at least avoidance
of a reputation as an ineffective or unwilling contributor—may be necessary for
establishing and maintaining fruitful friendships that facilitate mutually beneficial
exchanges of goods and services. Previous studies show that people with more
extensive social networks typically give more to charity. But, are people more
generous because they have more friends placing social pressure on them by
asking for donations, or do people with reputations for generosity attract more
friends? Most theorists studying this matter attribute increases in contributions to
social ties that expand an individual’s trust and respect for others (E. Brown &
Ferris, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2002; L. Wang & Graddy, 2008) or that increase an
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individual’s awareness and knowledge of ways to give (Apinunmahakul & Devlin,
2008; Bryant et al., 2003; Leonard et al., 2010; Putnam, 1995; L. Wang &
Graddy, 2008; Wiepking & Maas, 2009). Evolutionary theory, however, indicates
that the level of generosity individuals express is as likely to influence the
composition of their social relationships as to be an outcome of the composition
of their social relationships. I separately examine 1) the donation totals that
participants give in response to passive appeals from familiar associates and 2)
the size of participants’ friendship networks as a function of the total donation
amounts that participants give without any known associates collecting, asking
for, or witnessing the donation. I find that merely having more close friends in the
community does not correlate with increased giving in response to information
and requests from familiar associates. But, having more close friends who can be
counted on to drop everything at a moment’s notice to help does correspond with
larger totals given in response to direct requests from friends. These findings
suggest that people with more friends do not give more simply as a result of
learning about more good causes from their wider social networks. Instead,
people with more friends who can be relied on appear to invest more in their
social relationships by giving more charitable donations at the request of their
friends. I also find that people who give more to charity independent of any
information or social pressure from their friends and acquaintances have more
friends who can be relied upon and fewer friends who cannot be relied upon.
These results suggest that those who tend to behave more generously in
situations without a clear reputational payoff attract more friends who are willing
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to invest in the relationship and retain fewer close friends who are less
dependable as helpers. In total, the results suggest that generosity is as
important as a cause of social support as it is an outcome of social support.
Chapter 5 concludes by synthesizing the conclusions that I draw from this
dissertation project.
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CHAPTER 2. EXPRESSING CARE: THE PRESSURE TO
MAINTAIN SOCIAL REPUTATION PROMOTES GIVING IN
RESPONSE TO CHARITABLE DONATION APPEALS
We’d all like a reputation for generosity, and we’d all like to buy it cheap
—Mignon McLaughlin, The Neurotics Notebook
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Most donations are solicited
People often help others by carrying out kind acts that range from small
favors for friends (Boster et al., 1995) to taking life-threatening risks to rescue
strangers in peril (Becker & Eagly, 2004). This willingness to help extends to the
provisioning of public goods. In the United States, individual donors provide over
$290 billion per year in voluntary donations (Indiana University Lilly Family
School of Philanthropy, 2019) to sustain museums, libraries, arts, education,
research, public media, youth recreation, healthcare, human services, human
rights, foreign aid, political causes, religious institutions, and environmental
causes.
Americans support charity, but rarely offer unprompted gifts. Most donated
dollars are raised from donors who accede to appeals for donations. Still, people
do often give donations when asked. Easy-to-ignore mailed requests for a library
and a university yield donations from 3% to over 40% of recipients (Krupka &
Croson, 2016; Meer & Rosen, 2011). Salvation Army collectors obtain donations
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from 2% of by-passers just by ringing a bell (Jiobu & Knowles, 1974) and up to
21% of by-passers if the bell ringer simply establishes eye contact and asks for a
donation (Andreoni et al., 2017). Similarly, door-to-door solicitors for a natural
hazards research organization collect donations from 21% of those who open the
door (Landry et al. 2010). People who will not give on their own accord often
acquiesce when they are solicited directly for a donation (Andreoni et al., 2017;
DellaVigna et al., 2012). Given the importance of solicitations in mobilizing
donors, we stand to learn a great deal about why people give to charity by
investigating the factors that promote and inhibit the success of charitable
donation appeals. Here, I consider the role of social reputation in the giving
decisions that people make in response to requests for charitable donations.
2.1.2. Social reputation
Several theorists have proposed that visible generosity can enhance a
provider’s social prestige (Boone, 1998; Gintis et al., 2001; Glazer & Konrad,
1996; Harbaugh, 1998b; Milinski et al., 2002b; Ostrower, 1997; Zahavi, 1995) or
appeal as a beneficent social partner (Alexander, 1987; Fehrler & Przepiorka,
2013; Frank, 1988; Gurven et al., 2000; Hirschleifer, 1987; Leimar &
Hammerstein, 2001; Nesse, 2007; Roberts, 1998; Sugden, 2005; Trivers, 1971).
While wealthy donors can gain social prestige by giving large public gifts that
demonstrate their affluence (Boone, 1998; Gintis et al., 2001; Harbaugh, 1998a;
Ostrower, 1997; Zahavi, 1995), appeals for large public gifts are relatively
uncommon and targeted to select, elite donors. More typical requests seek
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donations of smaller sums that, if given, do not garner widespread public
attention. These more common appeals and how potential donors respond to
them can range from being very private, such as a request letter sent in the mail,
to being quite visible, such as a collection plate passed from worshipper to
worshipper at a religious service.
Giving decisions made in response to typical appeals for relatively modest
donations can enhance (or damage) a potential donor’s appeal as a beneficent
cooperative partner if others solicit, observe, or learn about the decision. First,
generous acts can demonstrate a provider’s effectiveness as an ally who can
sustain the costs of helping (Boone, 1998; Gintis et al., 2001; Roberts, 1998;
Zahavi, 1995). Second, generous acts can indicate a provider’s reliability as a
helper owing to a provider’s underlying social preference (Fehrler & Przepiorka,
2013) or emotional commitment (Frank, 1988; Hirschleifer, 1987) to offer help
reflexively. By displaying (or failing to show) such qualities, potential providers
might gain (or lose) the trust of peers who seek beneficent partners for social
interactions. Trust allows individuals to establish and maintain cooperative
relationships that facilitate repeated reciprocal exchanges of favors (Trivers,
1971) and mutual obligations to help one another in the event of a sudden injury,
illness, loss of livelihood, loss of resources, or a natural disaster (Cronk et al.,
2019). Given human capacities for language and technology, these cooperative
relationships can be important sources of crucial goods and services, including
social and emotional support, knowledge, special skills, mentoring, resources,
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tools, manufactured goods, labor, childcare, shelter, protection, and employment
prospects. In economies where discretionary income is common, one way that
people may appraise one another’s suitability as social partners is by attending to
one another’s generosity (or selfishness) when presented with helping decisions
like charitable donation requests. Consistent with this, participants in economics
experiments put more trust in and invest more in partners who publicly donate a
portion of their study earnings to charity (Albert et al., 2007; Fehrler & Przepiorka,
2013; Milinski et al., 2002b).
2.1.3. Factors in charitable appeals
If the pressure to maintain a reputation as a beneficent social partner plays
a role in the evolution and maintenance of human helping sentiments, we should
find that people feel more (or less) inclined to give when a giving decision is more
(or less) likely to change the perceptions that a potential donor’s probable future
interaction partners have toward the potential donor. Conditions that I expect to
cue possible reputational consequences for a potential donor are 1) a familiar
contact making an appeal, 2) a requester putting a potential donor on the spot to
acknowledge a request with an overt response, 3) a requester with a personal
stake in a cause asking for a donation, 4) appeals on behalf of beneficiaries who
benefit significantly from aid that a potential donor can easily afford to give, and
possibly 5) the presence of an audience.
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Social connection
The foregoing discussion leads to the prediction that people should be more
likely to give when a request comes from a familiar associate. Some charities call
on supporters to collect donations from their relatives, friends, acquaintances, coworkers, and neighbors. For example, participants in charity events recruit
friends as sponsors, advocates post online donation appeals targeting their
social media contacts, and children raise money for their extracurricular activities
by selling charity products to their neighbors. Since the benefits (and costs) of
building a favorable (or drawing an unfavorable) social reputation accrue over
future social interactions, potential donors should feel more pressure to give
when a familiar associate who a potential donor can anticipate interacting with in
the future makes a request.
Donors can foster social relationships by giving donations when familiar
associates ask. By demonstrating an ability and willingness to help when an
associate asks, donors may elicit social investment from their associates. After
all, people stand to gain by pursuing social relationships with social ties who
demonstrate an ability and willingness to provide benefits (Barclay, 2013;
Chiang, 2010). Since a donation entails a cost that provides no immediate
tangible return to a donor, support of a familiar associate’s chosen cause can
also indicate a donor’s long-term commitment to the social relationship or to
ideals shared with the requester.
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Conversely, a decision to ignore or deny a request from a familiar associate
runs the risk of creating alienation in the social relationship. Since social ties can
exploit social investments by accepting assistance without giving assistance (R.
M. Axelrod, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Stephens, 1996), individuals who
acquire reputations for free-riding or selfish tendencies may face difficulty finding
trusting exchange partners and collaborators (C. A. Aktipis, 2004; Feinberg et al.,
2014; Marlowe et al., 2011; Yamagishi et al., 1994). Further, if a requester reads
into a lack of contribution a potential donor’s lack of interest in the social
relationship itself (whether real or imagined), a decision against supporting an
associate’s chosen cause can create tension in future interactions.
Honoring (or refusing) a familiar associate’s appeal may also enhance (or
damage) a potential donor’s social reputation with a broader circle of associates.
Given the human capacity for language, people can assess one another not only
through direct interactions, but also by attending to third-party assessments of
one another’s generosity (Alexander, 1987; Enquist & Leimar, 1993; Feinberg et
al., 2014; Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Piazza & Bering, 2008; E. A. Smith, 2010; R.
D Sommerfeld et al., 2008; Trivers, 1971). Friends, acquaintances, co-workers,
and neighbors often have mutual friends, acquaintances, co-workers, and
neighbors in common. When a requester and a potential donor know people in
common, a familiar requester’s opinion of a potential donor can possibly inform
and influence a potential donor’s broader social reputation through word of
mouth. In this way, a decision to give (or not) in response to an appeal from a
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familiar associate can enhance (or damage) a potential donor’s social reputation
with one or more of the potential donor’s probable future interaction partners.
Direct request
Donation frequency may increase when a potential donor is put on the spot
to acknowledge a donation request with an overt reply. People can usually
dismiss appeals addressed to a group of potential donors, appeals to give
sometime in the future, and remote appeals (i.e., mailed form letters,
commercials, billboards, advertisements, news reports, or emails) without
drawing attention by merely taking no action. In contrast, face-to-face or phone
requests that directly ask individuals to answer in real-time with a decision to give
or not (e.g., “Can I count on you for a gift today?”) do not offer potential donors
an easy and inconspicuous way out. Non-donors who are put on the spot to
respond openly are obliged to justify their lack of generosity or risk appearing
unkind to an attentive advocate for the cause. Meanwhile, donors who agree to
give in response to an awaiting requester’s appeal have an engaged supporter of
the cause as an audience to the gift. Since the potential reputational gain (or
loss) is more significant when a decision to give (or not) is made clear to an
attentive observer, people are likely to feel more pressure to give when someone
asks them directly for a response. This leads to the prediction that potential
donors will be more likely to give when a requester pushes for a direct response.
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Stakeholder appeal
Sometimes, those collecting donations on behalf of a charity get involved
because they or a member of their family secure indirect aid or a social outlet
from the charity. Such stakeholder appeals are frequent for youth extracurricular
activities, emotional support groups, veterans’ organizations, disease research
organizations, civil rights organizations, and religious missionary trips. Potential
donors may infer that a requester who has a personal stake in a cause will
express more gratitude for a gift and greater scrutiny for a refusal to help.
Gratitude can equate to a more considerable boost in reputation for giving and a
higher loss of reputation for not contributing. Thus, I predict that potential donors
are more likely to give when an appeal comes from a stakeholder in the cause.
People can invest directly in social relationships by giving when friends,
acquaintances, co-workers, and neighbors seek donations for personally relevant
causes. Stakeholders tasked with raising money for a cause may turn to their
friends, co-workers, neighbors, and acquaintances for contributions. Indeed,
stakeholders in causes who donors know personally solicit around one-third of
the dollars that households give to charity (see Error! Reference source not
found.). Examples include a mother asking her co-workers to buy Girl Scout
cookies from her daughter, a cancer survivor asking friends to sponsor him in an
American Cancer Society run, a same-sex couple asking guests at their wedding
to make donations to an LGBTQ foundation in lieu of gifts, or a spouse of a
deployed soldier asking her neighbors to contribute to care packages for troops
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overseas. Since partners in established friendships tend not to calculate the
short-term costs and benefits of every exchange (Clark & Mills, 2011; Silk, 2003;
Xue & Silk, 2012), but instead attend to cues that a friend cares about them
(Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), the symbolic gesture of a donation
showing that a donor cares about a familiar associate may even matter more to
friends than the material costs and benefits of the transfer. While a potential
donor who ignores or turns down any appeal risks appearing uncaring, a
potential donor who ignores or turns down a request from a familiar associate
with a personal stake in the cause risks creating emotional distance in a social
relationship by appearing uninterested in the associate personally. Most people
presumably feel more pressure to give if approached at work by a co-worker
selling a tin of popcorn at a hefty premium for her son’s scout pack than if
approached by an unfamiliar scout mother at a grocery store exit offering an
identically priced tin of popcorn for the same cause. Although the material cost to
the potential donor and the material benefit to the hopeful mother is equivalent in
both scenarios, the potential social costs and benefits are much higher for the
potential donor in the first scenario.
Recipient need
Giving frequency is likely to increase as the degree of recipient need
increases. Food pantries, homeless shelters, health services, and emergency
relief organizations seek charitable contributions to provision beneficiaries who
lack food, water, healthcare, or shelter due to poverty, maladies, or natural
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disasters. When recipients are in acute need of basic necessities, donors pay
relatively low personal costs to give assistance that has much higher marginal
value for the recipients. Opportunities for helpers to pay relatively low costs to
provide very valuable benefits to recipients increase the viability of reciprocal
exchanges (Lehmann & Keller, 2006; Trivers, 1971) and need-based
provisioning (A. Aktipis, 2016), which presumably, should activate proximate
triggers that encourage helping. Indeed, emotions of sympathy and compassion
likely serve to motivate people to help those with the greatest needs since people
with more significant needs are likely to respond with greater gratitude (de Waal,
2008; Frank, 1988; Trivers, 1971).
Peers are likely to attend to who is willing (and who is not willing) to help
others in need since a disposition to help should be a key consideration in
evaluating potential exchange partners (Barclay, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides,
1996). People who have the means to help someone in dire need and choose
not to help may risk leaving the impression that they have a general disregard for
others’ needs. In contrast, by provisioning needy individuals who are unlikely to
be in a position to return assistance, providers may credibly demonstrate their
dependability as helpers who can be counted on to help even in the absence of
any assured return (Alexander, 1987; Frank, 1988; Roberts, 1998). In this way,
donors who support (or ignore) people in need may enhance (or damage) their
reputations as unselfish social partners and attract (or lose) social investment.
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This leads to the prediction that potential donors will give more often when a
request seeks help for people with great needs.
Audience size
Finally, the size of an audience at a donation opportunity might affect giving
rates. Some charitable solicitations occur in social settings. Members of hobby
groups and social clubs hear donation appeals during group meetings,
employers host workplace fund drives that encourage donors to come forward to
submit pledge cards in front of their coworkers, religious services pass collection
plates to assembled worshippers, and donation collection boxes are routinely
placed in busy public spaces. An important consideration in evaluating the
influence of an audience may be whether any observers are familiar associates
that potential donors anticipate meeting again. After all, cooperating to impress
strangers who donors will never interact with again makes no more strategic
sense than cooperation in one-shot encounters with strangers. Still, the impact of
an audience, whether familiar associates or strangers, is not straightforward.
On the one hand, the presence of others might increase the frequency of
donations. A giving decision made in public can carry greater reputational
consequences since an audience increases the number of possible future
interaction partners who may regard a potential donor more (or less) favorably
(Alexander, 1987). If people can gain favor from more cooperative partners or
from better cooperative partners by building a reputation for more exceptional
generosity than their peers, a crowd might even escalate generosity as people
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compete to appear more generous than others (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;
Roberts, 1998).
On the other hand, public settings might cast doubts on the motives of a
donor and might afford a degree of anonymity to a non-donor. Donations given in
the presence of an audience might not appreciably enhance a donor’s reputation
for generosity if observers discount public acts of generosity as selfish ploys to
be seen in a good light (Andrews, 2001; Barclay & Willer, 2007; Bénabou &
Tirole, 2006; Simpson & Willer, 2008). The presence of others who can help may
even moderate helping impulses. While a shirker who is the only available helper
risk of being singled out as uncaring if others learn of the inaction or refusal, a
shirker in a crowd containing other shirkers might forgo helping without attracting
a large degree of individual attention. The sight of others not helping or of others
fulfilling a need might moderate feelings of empathy, guilt, or social pressure that
encourage potential donors to act. In general, people show more apprehension
to help others as the number of bystanders to a helping opportunity increases
(Latané & Nida, 1981). This “bystander effect” was first established for
emergency interventions, however the effect is even stronger when help involves
money (Fischer et al., 2011).
2.2. Methods
To document people’s responses to charitable requests in social contexts in
which real-world charitable appeals occur, and to collect observations of longterm social relationships that are difficult to implement and control in
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experimental settings, I interviewed 512 individuals in person about the last
charitable appeal they saw or heard. I recruited participants randomly from New
Mexico State Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) field office waiting rooms by
approaching the first person to take a number to see an MVD clerk anytime I was
not already engaged with another (potential) participant. At the time of the
interviews, most New Mexicans maintained a driver’s license or state ID (to cash
checks or purchase alcohol) that required in-person renewal every four years. To
participate, participants had to be at least 18 years old. To compensate
participants for their time and to promote the participation of more selfish
individuals who may be less likely to give to charity and less likely to give time to
a researcher, I informed potential participants that they would be given $25 (2017
dollars) in immediate cash upon successful completion of an interview.
Since interviews occurred in semi-private spaces (an empty testing room at
one location, a lone bench in a mall lobby outside another office, or a set of
chairs set off in the corner of an MVD waiting room), I handed respondents cards
with letters and had participants read off the letter associated with their answers
to giving questions. Interviews began with participants reviewing a card listing
major types of nonprofits with examples of causes that fall within that type (as
presented in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1). Initial questions inquired about any recent
volunteering experiences the participants may have had with these
organizations. These questions got participants thinking about their experiences
with nonprofit organizations and ensured that participants understood the
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difference between giving direct help to others and giving to nonprofit
organizations. The scope of this study is limited to requests to donate to nonprofit
organizations. It does not include requests to help specific individuals, such as a
request from a panhandler, a collection at work to benefit a co-worker, or a
crowdfunding campaign to help a specific person or family in need.
Next, I informed participants that the discussion would turn to donations that
people sometimes make of money and other property to nonprofit organizations.
I told participants that members of households sometimes make giving decisions
together and asked the participant how many people live in their home, whether
any dependents are in the home, and who in the household is considered most
involved in deciding which charities, if any, the household supports.
To aid participants in the recall of the last appeal they had encountered, I
handed participants a card listing ways that people are often solicited for
charitable donations with each method preceded by a letter (see Table 2.1
below). I explained that the card listed the most common ways that people learn
of opportunities to give money or property for charitable purposes, which I
defined as “giving to an organization that is not-for-profit without expecting to
receive money, valuable goods, or services in return.” I asked participants to “just
call off the letter of any way that you became aware of a way to give money or
property to a charitable cause in the previous couple of weeks, regardless of
whether or not you actually gave anything.”
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Table 2.1. Some ways in which people may be asked to contribute money or
other property for charitable purposes
A. Receiving a letter or e-mail asking you to give
B. Being asked to give by someone you know
C. Someone coming to the door asking you to give
D. Being asked to give in a telethon, radiothon, or pledge drive
E. Receiving a phone call asking you to give
F. Seeing a social media post asking you to give
G. Seeing a television commercial asking you to give
H. Hearing a radio commercial asking you to give
I. Reading a newspaper, magazine, or internet advertisement asking
you to give
J. Reading or hearing a news story asking you to give
K. Being asked at work to give
L. Being asked by clergy or church leaders to give
M. Seeing a collection jar
N. Being asked to add a donation at checkout
O. Receiving a request in another way not listed
P. None of the above

To determine the most recent appeal a participant had encountered, I
asked participants who read off more than one letter to identify, for each letter,
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when the most recent request of that type occurred. For participants who
indicated “none of the above,” I asked them to read off the letter associated with
the last appeal they could recall seeing or hearing. After reading off a letter, I
asked these participants how long ago this appeal occurred. The most recent
request a participant saw or heard became the focus of the rest of the interview.
2.2.1. Measures of variables of interest
For appeals that were not received through television, radio, or print
mediums (responses D, F, G, H or I in Table 2.1 above), I first inquired about
who (if anyone) made the appeal and who the requester was. If the participant
identified the requester as a friend, acquaintance, co-worker, neighbor, fellow
church attendee, or relative, I code the requester as a “familiar associate.” If the
participant identified the requester as a representative of the nonprofit or a
stranger, I code the requester as “not a familiar associate.” Whenever there was
a question about whether the respondent knew the requester personally, I asked
participants if they would recognize the requester for a reason other than the
request if the requester walked by at that moment. I code positive responses as
“familiar associates” and negative responses as not “familiar associates.” I
originally coded relatives separately from other familiar associates, but only a
handful of requests came from relatives, so I combine them in this analysis.
Next, I inquired about what organization the appeal was for and what the
organization does. I code requests made on behalf of services for the poor (such
as food pantries or homeless shelters), disaster relief funds, international aid for
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impoverished recipients, or help for disabled or very sick recipients as requests
to help people with immediate basic needs. I coded causes involving arts
organizations, education, environmental protection, animal welfare, community
improvement, political organizations, civil rights, public media, and research
support as not going to people with dire immediate basic needs. For causes such
as religious organizations, donations going through umbrella organizations such
as the United Way, and health-related charities that use some money to support
people in need and some money for other public interests, I asked participants
what services they thought a donation would provide. I code these accordingly as
helping or not helping people in dire need of basic necessities. I also asked
participants whether the request included an offer of a “thank-you” gift for a
donation and, if so, what gift was offered.
For appeals that were made by an individual, I next inquired about how (if at
all) the requester or any member of the requester’s household was involved with
the nonprofit. This line of questioning began with me asking the participant, “Why
do you think [the requester] took an interest in raising money for [the nonprofit]?”
If the participant’s answer did not reveal any personal stake in the cause for the
requester, I followed up by asking the participant more directly if they were aware
of any involvement the requester or a member of the requester’s family had with
the non-profit. To illustrate, if a request was from a neighbor selling candy bars to
raise money for school field trips, I asked the respondent, “Do you know if your
neighbor or anyone in your neighbor’s family attends the school or works at the
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school the field trip money is for?”. For a request from a co-worker seeking
sponsorship in a charity run for cancer, I asked, “Are you aware of any way that
your co-worker or a member of your co-worker’s family has been touched by or
affected by cancer personally?”
I also asked participants if they were in public or if anyone else was present
at the time of the appeal. Since it may be essential to distinguish observers who
a potential donor knows personally and is likely to interact with again from
unfamiliar observers who a potential donor does not anticipate interacting with in
the future, I asked participants who indicated the presence of others how (if at all)
they knew the others present. I coded any bystanders the participant identified as
friends, acquaintances, co-workers, neighbors, fellow church attendees, or
relatives as a “familiar associate” and anyone else as “not a familiar associate.” If
there was any ambiguity, I asked participants (as above) whether they would
recognize the bystander(s) if the bystander(s) walked by at that moment.
For appeals made in person, if the respondent indicated that other people
(not counting the requester) were present for the appeal, I asked, “Did [the
requester] ask you personally if you would give or did [the requester] make one
appeal to [the whole group of people the participant identified as being present]?”
I asked participants who said they were asked personally, participants who were
asked on the phone, and participants who had stated before that they were alone
if they could remember the wording of the request. If they phrased the request as
a question, I asked, “Did [the requester] phrase it as a question, just like you
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gave it to me now, that (s)he wanted you to answer or was it more of a statement
just to let you know that you could give if you wanted, without directly asking if
you would?” If the participant did not word the request as a question, I asked:
“Did [the requester] phrase it as a statement, just like you gave it to me now, to
let you know you could give if you wanted to or did (s)he phrase it more as a
question (s)he wanted you to answer?” If the participant reported that they did
not remember the wording of the appeal, I asked them, “Do you think [the
requester] worded the request as a question that (s)he wanted you to answer or
more as a statement just to let you know that you could give if you wanted,
without asking you directly if you would?”
Finally, I informed participants that “some people give to charitable
organizations while others, for a variety of good reasons, choose not to give” and
reminded participants that “those who do sometimes give to charity cannot give
every time someone asks.” I then handed participants a card indicating “1 = no, 2
= yes” and asked them, “Did you give in response to the particular request we
have been talking about? —please just read off the number.”
Following the interview, participants filled out a paper survey to capture
demographic variables that might be important confounders in giving decisions
(i.e., age, ethnicity, education, gender, marital status, number of dependents,
church involvement, income, savings, and whether they itemize taxes and claim
charitable contributions). Sensitive questions regarding household income level
and household savings were pre-coded with sliding scales from which I use the
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midpoints and treat as continuous variables. I gave participants privacy to fill out
the survey form and asked them to put the completed form in an envelope to
receive their $25.
2.2.2. Probit estimation
I use a probit regression model to estimate the marginal effect that each
variable of interest has on the likelihood that participants donated in response to
the last charitable donation appeal they saw or heard. I specify the model as:
Equation 1
Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1 (𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑗 )] = Φ [𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑋𝑗 𝛽𝑗 ]
where Pr denotes probability; y represents whether potential donor i gives a
charitable contribution or not; Xi is the vector of regressors that characterize
potential donor i (income, savings, age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, number
of dependents, education, and non-involvement in household giving decisions);
Xj is the vector of regressors that characterize request j (known requester, asked
directly, requester has a personal stake, provides basic necessities to people in
need, the number of observers, and offer of a thank-you gift); Φ is the standard
distribution Cumulative Distribution Function; β represents maximum likelihood
estimates, and 0 is the null model. For each variable X in the model, β indicates
the change in Z-score for every one unit increase in X. Summing across β0 + Xiβi
+ Xjβj, where β0 is the intercept, Xiβi is the sum of i ‘s value for each personal
attribute in the model multiplied by the variable’s parameter estimate (the “control
variables” in Table 2.2 below), and Xjβj is the sum of j ‘s value for each request
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characteristic multiplied by its parameter estimate (the “request characteristics” in
Table 2.2 below), we obtain a Z-score for individual i presented with request j. I
compute probabilities from these Z-scores to estimate the marginal effect of each
variable Xj on the probability that individual i gives a donation.
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Respondent demographics
The results that follow are based on interviews with 472 of the 512
participants I interviewed. Fourteen participants could not recall any charitable
appeal within recent memory. Four participants could not recall specifics about
the last request they encountered. I omitted two participants who reported that
they still planned to give in response to the last appeal they heard or saw but had
not had a chance to give yet. The remaining 20 missing participants could not
remember or declined to supply information for one or more of the variables
included in the analysis.
Participants in the study had a mean age of 42.13 and a median income of
$46,500 (2017 dollars). 55% identified as White (non-Hispanic), 33% identified as
Hispanic, 5% identified as Native American, 4% identified as African American,
1% identified as Asian, and 2% opted out of answering. 51.4% were female,
48.9% were married, 94.6% were high school graduates, and 26.8% had a 4year college degree. Respondents had a mean of 0.78 dependents, a median of
$5,500 (2017 dollars) in savings, and 69.2% considered themselves to be
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involved as a primary decision maker in their household’s charitable giving
decisions.
2.3.2. Appeal characteristics
The most recent requests recalled by participants may oversample more
memorable requests. The most recent charitable appeal that participants recalled
encountering occurred a median of 5 days before the interview. Most of these
appeals came either from strangers (34.75%) or through impersonal media
appeals (42%). Since people are more likely to forget quick, unimportant events
(Dex, 1995), respondents may have encountered phone solicitations, requests to
add a small donation at checkout, mailings, and advertisements that they forgot
about or never paid any mind. If so, people may have encountered even more
appeals from strangers and through media appeals than they recalled. Over half
of the appeals that respondents recalled sought aid for people in dire need of
basic necessities (59.6%). 22.95% of requests were made by someone the
respondent knew personally, and 37.92% were addressed to the respondent as a
direct question, 23% were made by a requester with a personal stake in the
cause, 21.76% occurred in the presence of at least one person (excluding any
requester) who the potential donor knew personally, and only 1.4% occurred in
the presence of others who were all strangers. Respondent recall may
oversample instances where they donated since these will be more memorable
than requests that did not elicit a donation. Participants gave in response to
34.12% of the appeals they recalled. Despite an expectation of recall bias, this
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giving rate is in line with donor compliance rates found in observational studies
(see 2.1.1 above), especially considering that giving rates reported in prior
studies reflect responses to appeals that come almost entirely from strangers.
22.95% of the appeals in the present study are made by personally known
requesters who are expected to be more successful than strangers at eliciting
donations.
2.3.3. Demographic confounders
Church involvement, marginal tax rate, and the number of days separating
the interview from the request did not significantly predict giving and did not
explain variation sufficiently well as measured by Δ AICc to be included in the
model (see Arnold, 2010 for a discussion of Δ AICc units). I drop these variables
from the analyses that follow. Several demographic variables are included in the
model and are presented in Table 2.2 (below). Donation likelihood initially
increases with age (β=.056, z=2.13, p=.03) but then decreases with advanced
age (age2/100, β=-.062, z=-2.21, p=.03). Household composition influences
giving, with marriage increasing the likelihood of giving (β=.351, z=2.13, p=.03)
and the number of dependents decreasing the likelihood of giving (β=-.199 z=2.71, p=.01). Concerning education, a high school diploma is associated with a
lower likelihood of donating (β=-.612, z=-1.99, p=.04) while a 4-year college
degree restores some of this loss—although the counter-effect of a college
education is only marginally significant (β=.324, z=.190, p=.06). Other variables
that improve model fit as measured by Δ AICc, but only marginally predict the
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likelihood of donations are log income (β=.167, z=1.78, p=.07), being female
(β=.244, z=1.72, p=.08), and being offered a thank-you gift for a donation
(β=.288, z=-1.67, p=.09). Log savings (β=-.034, z=-1.92, p=.06) and identifying
as White (non-Hispanic) (β=-.249, z=-1.75, p=.08) are only marginally significant
predictors of a reduced likelihood of giving but are included in the model because
they improve model fit. Finally, involvement as a main decision-maker in
household charitable giving decisions does not significantly predict contributions
(β=-.258, z=-1.23, p=.22) but improves model fit as measured by Δ AICc
sufficiently well to warrant inclusion.
Note that this model estimates how likely people are to give in response to
the last request they encountered, not how likely people are to give anything over
time. Some of the associations of demographic factors with giving rates may
stem as much or more from unmeasured differences in the types or the
frequency of requests that people of different demographic backgrounds are
exposed to than with real differences in people’s general likelihood of giving due
to demographic factors. Likewise, some demographic variables that are
associated with more giving over time may not predict the likelihood that
someone gives in response to the last request they encountered. For example,
income does not significantly predict the likelihood that respondents gave in
response to the last appeal they recall encountering. Yet, respondents with more
income report more charitable giving throughout the year (see Chapter 4).
Wealthier people may be no more likely than poorer people to give in response to
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each request they receive but may still give more often throughout the year
because they receive more requests to give.
2.3.4. Social factors in charitable donation requests
As predicted, situational factors that raise the reputational stakes of a giving
decision increase the likelihood that a potential donor donates (see Table 2.2
panel A, below). The most significant effect captured by the model is whether a
potential donor knows a requester personally or not. When a requester and a
respondent know one another personally, the likelihood of a donation increases
sharply (β=.1.428, z=7.12, p < .001). The second-largest effect in the model is
whether an appeal is made as a direct request or not. When a requester puts a
potential donor on the spot to respond, the likelihood of a donation increases
significantly (β=.741, z=4.71, p <.001). Giving also increases significantly when a
potential donor receives a request from someone with a personal stake in the
cause (β=.503, z=2.36, p=.02). Finally, if an appeal is to help beneficiaries who
need basic necessities, the likelihood of a donation increases significantly
(β=.461, z=2.37, p=.02).
The number of available observers at a donation opportunity, whether the
potential donor knows them (β=.0001, z=0.45, p=.65) or not (β=.021, z=0.45,
p=.65), does not significantly predict giving (see Table 2.2 panel A below). To
further examine whether the presence of onlookers might matter more than the
number of onlookers, I replaced the counts of observers with binary variables for
the presence or absence of observers. There was still no effect for observers. I
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also examined whether large numbers of onlookers might have a different impact
than initial numbers of observers, by adding the square of the number of
strangers present (both alongside and without a measure for the square of the
number of known associates present). Again, I found no observer effect on
giving.
2.3.5. Predicted probability calculations
To better understand the magnitude of social connections, direct requests,
requester involvement, and need in influencing people’s giving decisions, we can
use the parameter estimates in Equation 1 (above) to estimate the likelihood
that a request is successful. But first, since the measures for the number of
observers are uninformative, I drop them from the probit model and calculate
corrected parameter estimates for the remaining variables (Table 2.2 panel B
below). The lower AICc value for the reduced model suggests that no vital
information is lost by dropping the two observer variables. Additionally, the
conclusions drawn above from the hypothesis test model remain unchanged as
both models produce very similar estimates for all parameters retained in the
reduced model (compare Table 2.2 panel A to panel B below).
The corrected parameter estimates (Table 2.2 panel B) provide measures
of β in Equation 1 (above). Because the effect of any variable depends on the
values of each of the other variables in the model, I demonstrate the effect of the
situational variables, Xj, for three representative individuals with personal
attributes, Xi, that reflect the median and interquintile range of giving likelihoods

59

Table 2.2. Probit estimation of giving in response to a charitable request

Intercept
Control variables
Log income

A. Hypothesis test model
Paramete
Std.
z value
r estimate
Error
-3.634
1.018
-3.57***

B. Probability calculation model
Paramete
Std.
z value
r estimate
Error
-3.619
1.017
-3.56***

0.167

0.094

1.78.

0.163

0.093

1.75.

-0.034

0.018

-1.92.

-0.034

0.018

-1.93.

0.056

0.026

2.13*

0.057

0.026

2.16*

-0.062

0.028

-2.21*

-0.063

0.028

-2.25*

0.244

0.142

1.72.

0.244

0.141

1.73.

-0.249

0.142

-1.75.

0.142

-1.76.

Married (0=no, 1=yes)

0.351

0.165

2.13*

0.366

0.163

2.24*

Number of dependents

-0.199

0.073

-2.71**

-0.200

0.073

-2.74**

High school degree (0=no, 1=yes)

-0.612

0.307

-1.99*

-0.611

0.307

-1.99*

0.324

0.171

1.90.

0.331

0.170

1.95.

-0.258

0.219

-1.23

-0.263

0.210

-1.26

Known requester (0=no, 1=yes)

1.428

0.201

7.12***

1.464

0.186

7.86***

Asked directly (0=no, 1=yes)
Requester has personal stake (0=no,
1=yes)
Provides basic necessities (0=no,
1=yes)
Number of familiar associates present

0.741

0.157

4.71***

0.739

0.157

4.72***

0.503

0.213

2.36*

0.519

0.212

2.45*

0.461

0.1958

2.37*

0.465

0.194

2.34*
----

Log savings
Age
2

Age / 100
Female (0=no, 1=yes)
White (Non-Hispanic) (0=no, 1=yes)

4 year college degree (0=no, 1=yes)
Noninvolvement in household giving
decisions (0=decision maker, 1=not
decision maker)
Request characteristics

< 0.001

-0.25

0.001

0.45

----

----

Number of strangers present

0.021

0.0476

0.45

----

----

----

Gift offered

0.288

0.172

1.67.

0.283

0.172

1.64

Fit statistics
Null deviance
Residual deviance
AICc

593.92 on 457 degrees of
freedom
437.49 on 439 degrees of
freedom
477.23

593.92 on 457 degrees of
freedom
437.90 on 457 degrees of
freedom
473.2933

Number of Fisher scoring iterations
5
5
. Significant at the .10 level, * Significant at the .05 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, *** Significant at the .001
level

for the study population. I calculate median likelihoods by using the personal
characteristics of “Casey” (Xi values: $57,500 income, one-year of income in
savings, 44, male of color, divorced, no dependents, high school degree, only
decision-maker in the household) who falls in the middle of distribution with half
of the participants having characteristics associated with higher likelihoods of
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giving and half of the participants having characteristics associated with lower
probabilities of giving. I calculate the first quintile likelihoods by using the
personal attributes of “Leslie” (Xi values: $32,500 income, $17,500 savings, 47,
white male, married, 2 dependent children, associate degree, involved in
household giving decisions) who has sociodemographic characteristics (such as
a large amount of savings relative to income, being male, having multiple
dependents, and having a high school degree but no 4 year college degree) that
are associated with a higher likelihood of giving than 20% of the study population
(and a lower likelihood of giving than 80% of the study population). I calculate the
fourth quintile likelihoods by using the personal attributes of “Morgan” (Xi values:
$67,500 income, $12,500 in savings, 27, white female, married, 2 dependent
children, 4-year college degree, involved in household giving decisions) who has
sociodemographic characteristics (such as a high income relative to savings,
being female, and having a college degree) that are associated with a higher
likelihood of giving than 80% of the study population (and a lower likelihood of
giving than 20% of the study population). To the extent that respondents recall
solicitations that were successful over solicitations that they declined or ignored,
the likelihood estimates that follow may be inflated. However, changes in
probability as request characteristics change should be informative.
To estimate the marginal effect of each request variable of interest, Xj, I
begin with a baseline appeal that does not come from a familiar associate, is not
asked as a direct question, does not come from a stakeholder in the cause, does
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not seek support for people in need of basic necessities, and does not offer a
“thank-you” gift. An example of such a request would be an appeal on the radio
to support a local arts organization. In response to such an appeal, our median
giver has a 6% probability of giving, with our interquintile givers giving with
probabilities of 3% and 12% (Figure 2.1 below). Note that the median probability
does not indicate that 6% of the population will give. It indicates that a person
who is more likely than half of the sample population and less likely than half of
the sample population only has a 6% likelihood of giving. Across the sample
population, no one is likely to give in response to our baseline request, as even
the most likely giver in the sample has only a 36% likelihood of giving.
Giving increases dramatically when a request comes from someone a
potential donor knows personally. Imagine a request that is presented to a group
of friends, whether in person, over email, or through social media. Even when a
known requester is not personally involved with the cause and does not ask
directly, the median probability of a donation increases to 47% with an
interquintile range of 34% - 61% (Figure 2.1 below). Thus, when a familiar
associate makes a request, rather than a stranger, our median giver is over 7
times more likely to give (47% vs. 6%), our lower quintile giver is over 11 times
more likely to give (34% vs. 3%), and our upper quintile giver is over 5 times
more likely to give (61% vs. 12%). The upper quintile likelihood exceeding 50%
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Figure 2.1 Interquintile probability of giving in response to a charitable request in
the form of a baseline appeal ◆, with an offer of a “thank-you” gift ◼,
to help people in need of basic necessities , from a stakeholder in a
cause , as a direct request  , and from a known requester ●

means that over 20% of the study population is more likely to give than not when
a request comes from a familiar contact.
Although not as dramatic, giving probabilities also increase substantially
when a potential donor is put on the spot to respond. Consider a direct question
asking a specific individual, “Will you give today?”, as often occurs when an
appeal is made over the phone by a representative of a non-profit. When put on
the spot by a requester asking for support of a cause that does not help people
with acute needs, the median likelihood of giving is 21% with an interquintile
range of 13% to 33% (Figure 2.1 above). Thus, when it is difficult to avoid giving
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a response to a requester, giving probabilities more than quadruple for our lower
quintile giver (13% vs. 3%) more than triple for our median giver (21% vs. 6%),
and more than double for our upper quintile giver (33% vs. 12%) over our
baseline appeal. Still, most people are unlikely to give in response to even a
direct request as only 3% of the study population has a likelihood of giving that
exceeds 50%.
If a passive appeal is made by a stranger who receives a benefit (such as a
social outlet) from a cause that is not to help people in need of basic necessities,
giving probabilities more than double over our baseline request, even without any
offer of a “thank you” gift. For example, imagine a group of boys in baseball
uniforms standing outside a supermarket with a sign seeking donors to fund their
travel to a tournament. Here, the median likelihood of giving is 15%, with an
interquintile range of 9% to 26% (Figure 2.1 above). However, such appeals
usually involve a fundraising sale. If the boys are standing behind a table of
sweets that can be “purchased” to support their trip, giving likelihood increases to
23% with an interquintile range of 14% to 35%. Although a direct request
increases the likelihood that a potential donor will give, only 3% of the sample is
more likely than not to purchase a sweet from a boy who makes a request.
Now, consider the most common appeals that participants reported seeing
and hearing; impersonal media appeals to help people in dire need of basic
necessities. When we imagine charitable giving, this is often the situation we
picture. An example would be a Red Cross giving campaign on TV following a
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devastating natural disaster. People respond to others in need, with a 14%
median likelihood of giving and an interquintile range of 8% to 24% which is
about twice as likely as in response to our baseline request (Figure 2.1 above).
However, giving is still unlikely overall with our upper quintile giver, who is more
likely than 80% of the participants in the study to give, contributing with a
probability of only 24%. Less than 1% of the study population is more likely to
give than not when presented with a request to help others in great need.
Giving becomes more likely than not for most of the sample population
when a potential donor receives an appeal from a familiar associate who either
has a personal stake in the cause or who asks for an overt response. As an
example of the former, consider a request from family members at a funeral for
guests to support research to fight a condition that runs in the family of the
deceased in lieu of flowers. Here, the median likelihood of giving is 67%, with an
interquintile range of 54% to 79% (Figure 2.2 below). Now imagine a friend
asking directly, “I’m taking collections for the local animal shelter, will you give?”
When a familiar associate with no personal stake in a cause makes a direct
request, the median likelihood of giving increases to 75% with an interquintile
range of 63% to 85% (Figure 2.2 below).
Finally, consider a common occurrence, parents asking friends and coworkers to buy something (such as candy bars, gift cards, or Girl Scout cookies)
to support their children’s extracurricular activities (such as a sports team, band
trip, or Girl Scout troop). When a request is from a familiar associate, the familiar
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Figure 2.2. Interquintile probability of giving in response to a charitable request
from familiar associates who make impersonal passive requests ●,
have a personal stake in the cause ◆, ask directly , have a personal
stake in the cause and offer a “thank-you” gift , or have a personal
stake and ask directly ◆

requester has a personal stake in the cause, and a “thank-you” premium is
offered, giving is very likely with our median giver having a 76% probability of
giving, our lower quintile giver having a 65% probability of giving, and our upper
quintile giver having an 86% probability of giving--even when the request is
passive (Figure 2.2 above). If a familiar associate with a personal stake in a
cause makes a direct request, regardless of whether a “thank-you” gift is
involved, giving is very likely. Here, the median likelihood of giving is 88% with an
interquintile range of 80% to 94% without a fundraising product involved (Figure
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2.2 above) and 93% with an interquintile range of 87% to 97% with a fundraising
product involved.
2.4. Discussion
The results here suggest that people respond to cues of reputational stakes
when making giving decisions in response to appeals for charitable contributions.
Although impersonal media appeals or requests from strangers are the most
common methods of solicitation, these commonplace requests only minimally
impact a potential donor’s reputation with familiar associates and only elicit
occasional donations. People are more likely to donate in social contexts where
the reputational consequences of the decision are heightened due to 1) a familiar
associate making the appeal, 2) a requester putting a potential donor on the spot
by asking directly for an overt response, 3) a stakeholder in the cause making the
appeal, or 4) beneficiaries benefiting greatly from aid that a potential donor can
easily afford to give. In general, as the personal connection between a requester
and a potential donor increases, the likelihood of a donation increases.
2.4.1. The role of need
Appeals to help people in acute need of food, shelter, clothing, or basic
medical care due to poverty, natural disasters, or pressing health needs are the
most common appeals that people report encountering, usually as media
campaigns and news stories. People should attend to cues of significant
asymmetries in the cost of providing aid to the benefit of assistance for recipients
since such asymmetries increase the viability of reciprocal exchanges (Lehmann
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& Keller, 2006; Trivers, 1971) and need-based provisioning (A. Aktipis, 2016).
People respond to a recipient’s degree of need when giving direct help (Bickman
& Kamzan, 1973; Cappelen et al., 2013), as early as age five (Engelmann et al.,
2016; Malti et al., 2016; Paulus, 2014; Sabato & Kogut, 2018), and across many
cultural contexts (Allen-Arave et al., 2008; Aspelin, 1979; Cadelina, 1982;
Gervais, 2017; Gurven et al., 2004; D. Smith et al., 2018). Although donations
given to charity are not reciprocated or directly paid back if the donor should
have pressing needs later, people who are moved to respond to the immediate
needs of others by feelings of sympathy and compassion might attract social
investment from peers who seek such qualities in their social partners. This will
be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
When we think of people giving to charity, we often picture people donating
to help others in need. When an appeal seeks aid for beneficiaries who have
acute needs, potential donors can be 2 to over 2 ½ times more likely to give.
Although this is a substantial increase, the likelihood of most people giving in
response to an appeal to help others in need still ranges from only 8% to 24% for
the majority of participants. Overall, less than 10% of dollars given by individual
donors in the U.S. go to help people with basic needs of food, water, shelter, or
other necessities (P. M. Rooney et al., 2007). People do sometimes give to help
others in need, but they give much more often when they have a personal
connection with a requester.
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2.4.2. The role of personal connections
As personal connections between requesters and potential donors
increase, the likelihood of a donation generally increases. Requests become
more personal when someone who benefits personally from a cause makes the
appeal. When a requester has a personal stake in a cause, a potential donor
may anticipate that the requester will show personal appreciation for a gift and
may feel trepidation that not giving will lead the requester to feel personally
rejected. When a stakeholder makes a request, a potential donor’s probability of
giving can double or triple.
A requester who asks a potential donor for a reply to an appeal establishes
a direct personal interaction with the request. Potential donors who do not
contribute at least a small token amount are obliged to respond with either an
excuse or a flat refusal. In this situation, the probability of a donation can more
than double or quadruple. The personal interaction involved in responding to a
requester may explain why individuals who ignore repeated mailed donation
appeals often accede to a phone request (Meer & Rosen, 2011), face-to-face
requests outperform mailed appeals (Landry et al., 2010), and solicitations that
are made face-to-face or by phone elicit many pledges that are never sent in
(Brockner et al., 1984; Fleming & Tappin, 2012).
The best single predictor of the likelihood that a potential donor will give in
response to an appeal for a charitable contribution is the presence of a social
relationship between a requester and a potential donor. Since potential donors
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can usually anticipate reoccurring interactions with a familiar requester, any
impressions a potential donor leaves by giving (or not giving) a donation can
carry protracted reputational consequences. Further, potential donors will often
share many of the same social circles with a familiar requester (e.g., friends will
have friends in common, neighbors will have neighbors in common, and coworkers will have co-workers in common) which increases the odds that other
meaningful people in a potential donor’s life may be influenced by a familiar
requester’s impression of the potential donor’s generosity (or stinginess). It is no
surprise then that potential donors can be 5 to 11 times more likely to donate
when a familiar associate, rather than a stranger, makes an appeal.
The importance of leaving a good impression with familiar associates likely
explains why nonprofits routinely enlist supporters to reach out to their social
contacts for donations. An implication is that sponsorships in charity runs and
trinkets in fundraising sales are not successful because of the run or the trinket,
but because of the pretense a sponsorship or trinket gives for people to make
appeals to their friends, acquaintances, co-workers, and neighbors. In the
present study, requests that include offers of “thank-you” gifts are more likely to
result in a donation, but the relationship is only marginally significant. The effect
of being asked by a friend, acquaintance, co-worker, or neighbor, on the other
hand, is immense and highly significant.
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2.4.3. The role of established personal relationships
The likelihood of a donation is highest in social circumstances where a
potential donor’s receptivity to a charitable appeal has a significant prospect of
fostering or stifling an existing social connection. Most potential donors have a
54% to 79% probability of giving when a familiar associate with a personal stake
in a cause makes an appeal. A donation collected by a familiar associate with a
personal stake in a cause can foster a social relationship by indicating a donor’s
interest in maintaining a long-term affable relationship with the requester. Such
an investment can be profitable over the long run if the benefits of more favorable
interactions over time outweigh the short-term costs of supporting an associate
who has a personal stake in a cause. Presumably, feelings of warmth toward
friends promote such giving without any conscious desire for prospective returns
(Frank, 1988; Hruschka, 2010). Conversely, a potential donor who ignores or
turns down a request from a familiar associate with a personal stake in a cause
risks harming the social relationship by creating an impression of not caring
about the familiar requester personally.
Giving is also more likely than not when a potential donor receives an
appeal from a familiar associate who asks for a direct response. Most people
have a 63% to 85% probability of giving when this occurs. A potential donor who
is put on the spot by a familiar requester waiting for an answer cannot easily or
inconspicuously ignore the appeal. In this situation, a potential donor can commit
to a donation that a familiar associate who supports the cause is sure to
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perceive. Meanwhile, a non-donor must provide an excuse or a flat refusal that
may leave a bad impression with a familiar associate who holds a strong enough
belief in the cause to seek donations from others. Among friends, turning down a
request might even be construed as “cheating” on a social obligation to a partner.
The potential cost of harming social relationships may be why people experience
feelings of guilt when faced with the prospect of not meeting obligations to
familiar social partners (Frank 1988). If a familiar associate with a personal stake
in a cause asks for a direct response to an appeal, most people have over an
89% probability of giving.
The importance of building and maintaining a reputation for generosity with
familiar associates may account for observations that people who display
generosity in one social setting do not always extend their generosity to another
social setting. For example, religious involvement promotes donations at church
but does not associate with increased giving in experimental settings (Bekkers
2007; Eckel and Grossman 2004). Similarly, being motivated to give by a request
from a personal friend, business associate, or clergy correlates with larger yearly
giving totals while being motivated to give by a phone call or person coming to
the door does not (Schervish and Havens 1997). The potential costs and benefits
of appearing selfish or generous are heightened in dealings with fellow
churchgoers, personal friends, business associates, or clergy that one is likely to
interact with again in comparison to dealings with anonymous lab partners,
experimenters, or paid solicitors that one is unlikely to be paired with again in
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future social interactions. This is also consistent with findings suggesting that the
strong association of church participation with charitable giving (Hodgkinson and
Weitzman 1996; Wiepking and Maas 2009) results, not from religiosity itself, but
from the social pressure of being integrated in a community that frequently
makes appeals for charitable donations (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008; Brown and
Ferris 2007; Jackson et al. 1995; Wang and Graddy 2008).
2.4.4. The lack of an audience effect
Although donations and refusals of requests can only impact a potential
donor’s reputation directly when others perceive the action, the number of
possible witnesses at a request does not significantly predict giving. It does not
matter whether others present are familiar associates or strangers. This can
seem incongruent with the fact that several experiments find that people give
more when their charitable donations become less private (Alpizar et al., 2008;
Basil et al., 2006; Böhm & Regner, 2013; List et al., 2004; Powell et al., 2012;
Reinstein & Riener, 2012; Soetevent, 2005). It also contrasts with the finding that
visitors to a National Park in Costa Rica who travel with companions are more
likely to give a donation than lone visitors, especially if another visitor who is not
part of the traveler’s group is present (Alpízar & Martinsson, 2013). Yet, several
other lines of evidence indicate that people do not give more—and often give
less—in the presence of an audience. Studies have found that charitable
donations decrease when participants are placed in larger groups (Wiesenthal et
al., 1983) or are primed to imagine themselves in a group (Garcia et al., 2002).
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Consistent with expectations of free-riding, individual parishioners in American
churches give less money as congregation size increases (Davidson & Pyle,
1994; Finke et al., 2006; D. V. A. Olson & Caddell, 1994; Sullivan, 1985; Zaleski
& Zech, 1992). Even when free-riding is not evident, members of larger
congregations give no more than their counterparts in smaller congregations
(Lipford, 1995). Given that American churches typically collect offerings by
passing collection plates while congregation members are assembled, this
suggests that rather than being eager to display their generosity to a broader
audience of peers, individuals seek to give less when they can get away with it.
It may be that people are less likely to give when a donation is anonymous,
but once a donation is not anonymous, increasing numbers of observers do not
further promote giving. The finding that subtle cues of being watched only
increase contributions during hours that fewer people are around (Ekström,
2012) supports this possibility. The potential benefit of having a bigger audience
perceive one’s generosity (Alexander 1987; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006) may be
offset by an increased risk of also attracting scroungers who seek out generous
individuals to exploit. The benefit may also disappear if audiences regard a public
donor’s motives with skepticism (Andrews, 2001; Barclay & Willer, 2007;
Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Simpson & Willer, 2008). A crowd may also afford
potential donors with anonymity, decreasing a potential donor’s worry of being
singled out as uncaring.

74

2.4.5. Conclusion
Overall, these results suggest that people accede to charitable appeals to
avoid acquiring reputations as ungiving social partners more so than they
welcome requests as an opportunity to display more exceptional generosity than
others. Most people do not seek out giving opportunities but must be asked to
give. People do not give more when an audience is present but are more likely to
give when it is difficult to avoid a request inconspicuously. For typical appeals for
small donations, the need to maintain a reputation as a beneficent social partner
likely motivates much giving. Elite donors who are pursued by fundraising
professionals for large gifts, however, may give for different reasons and might
respond to different cues. For instance, a display indicating that an elite donor’s
sizeable gift supports a socially prominent institution may provide a more robust
indicator of a donor’s wealth and leading social position than a gift given out of
compassion for people with dire needs. We might find then that the need of a
cause’s beneficiaries matters less for elite donors, but the visibility of a gift
matters more. One of the most remarkable things about human cooperation is
our capacity to solve a wide range of cooperative dilemmas and to help one
another in many different circumstances for different reasons. Our ability to track
one another’s reputations for consideration in future interactions appears to play
a significant role in the charitable contributions that people give and likely
contributes to the more general richness and breadth of human cooperation.
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CHAPTER 3. THE SOCIALITY OF CHARITABLE GIVING

Charity begins, but doth not end, at home
— Thomas Fuller, Appeal of Injured Innocence
3.1. Introduction to the problem
In one month, an average of 2 out of 5 people in developed nations and 1 in
4 people in developing nations provide voluntary donations to charity. In a couple
of dozen countries, including the United States, over half of the population
donates to charity in a single month (CAF, 2018). Seeking to understand why
people willingly expend personal resources on charity, social scientists have
published numerous studies documenting the sociodemographic and personality
characteristics of donors. Studies find that people who give more to charity tend
to be financially secure, educated, religious, married with children, older, and
more emphatic (for reviews, see Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Wiepking &
Bekkers, 2012). The social settings in which donors give their contributions,
however, remain largely undocumented. This study addresses this gap in our
knowledge by documenting the social contexts of donations.
Individual giving decisions are likely context-dependent, and an
understanding of the social contexts in which people give their donations may
ultimately provide more insight into why people give than studies of donor
characteristics. The shortage of studies describing the social contexts of
donations may stem from popular perceptions of donors who give from the
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privacy of their homes to organizations that help disadvantaged strangers.
Donations given in this manner do not resemble typical forms of aid giving
because donors help in isolation and never interact personally with the
beneficiaries of their help. In this scenario, donors and beneficiaries usually do
not even know one another’s identity. If most donations occur in isolated, private
settings like this, factors such as social expectations, social bonding, and social
reputation that promote helping behaviors more generally seemingly play little
role in motivating charitable donors.
Yet, donors must learn about causes before they can help and need a way
to hand over their donations, either of which can involve social settings where
peers solicit, collect, or witness a donor’s gift. Donors may even interact directly
with beneficiaries of assistance who personally solicit and collect contributions
from donors. Social contexts surrounding donations can run the gamut from brief,
anonymous interactions with strangers to direct interactions in familiar social
settings with relatives, friends, coworkers, neighbors, or acquaintances. The
extent to which charitable donations transpire in the course of ordinary social
interactions with family, friends, or acquaintances and not in private and
anonymous social settings holds important implications for understanding what
roles, if any, social connections and social reputation play in encouraging
charitable donations.
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3.1.1. The social contexts of charitable giving
First, consider how donors learn about causes. Donors learn about causes
through mailings, media advertisements, and news stories without interacting
with others; but donors also learn about causes through social interactions with
others. Just over half of the donation appeals that people encounter are
conveyed by another person (see Chapter 2). These appeals usually come from
strangers such as a representative calling with a phone appeal, a volunteer
coming to the door to ask for a donation, or a cashier asking to add a small
donation at checkout.
However, people also learn about giving campaigns from relatives, friends,
and acquaintances who advocate for causes. Indeed, many campaigns call on
supporters to bundle donations from their family, friends, coworkers, and
neighbors. For example, friends ask for sponsorships in charity events,
acquaintances spread online campaigns through social media, neighborhood
youth come to the door with fundraising sales, and business associates extend
invitations to charity galas. In total, 23% of the donation appeals that people see
or hear come from someone the target of the appeal knows personally (see
Chapter 2).
Some donations involve direct social interactions between advocates who
are stakeholders in a cause and donors who support the cause. Recipients of
nonprofit services and participants in activities that rely on donations have an
incentive to fundraise for the programs that serve them. Youth extracurricular
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activities, emotional support groups, veterans’ organizations, disease research
organizations, civil rights organizations, and religious programs are examples of
nonprofits that routinely recruit stakeholders to fundraise. These fundraising
efforts may involve stakeholders soliciting donations from others on behalf of the
nonprofit or stakeholders selling items (often sweets, trinkets, car washes, or
coupon books) with proceeds supporting the nonprofit. To raise these funds,
stakeholders often seek donations from strangers by going door-to-door or by
setting up fundraising tables at busy shopping centers.
Yet, stakeholders also solicit donations from family, friends, and
acquaintances either in person, by phone, or online. For example, students sell
trinkets to their grandparents to support their schools, parents sell Girl Scout
cookies to their coworkers to support their daughters’ local troop, and cancer
survivors seek sponsorships in cancer runs from their social media contacts.
Second, consider the settings in which donors hand over their donations.
Donors can give in private contexts with no one else observing the contribution
as often occurs when donors mail off checks or enter payment information online
at a nonprofit’s website. Donors may also give donations in public spaces.
Examples include a donation left in a collection box at a checkout counter, a
purchase from a fundraising sales table set up outside a supermarket, a donation
handed over to a fireman holding out a boot at a stoplight, or change dropped
into a bell ringer’s collection kettle during the busy holiday shopping season.

79

Other people may witness a donation given in a public space, but donors usually
do not know these observers personally.
However, donors also give charitable donations in social settings where
friends, co-workers, neighbors, or acquaintances may observe their
contributions. This occurs when club members contribute to campaigns at club
meetings, employees make pledges in the presence of their coworkers during
workplace fund drive events, churchgoers place offerings in collection plates that
pass from worshipper to worshipper, individuals give donations from their
pockets during social gatherings with friends, or residents leave property
donations for curbside pickup in bright, marked bags that their neighbors may
see. The social contexts in which people give their donations hold important
implications for our understanding of why people donate.
3.1.2. Donations as kin support and social relationship investment
Donors may give donations to support relatives. Nepotistic aid may arise
with comparative ease in comparison to other forms of cooperation since helpers
receive indirect fitness benefits when aiding close relatives (Hamilton, 1964). In
general, kin-directed aid should predominately flow from older relatives who pay
lower marginal costs in supplying aid to younger relatives who obtain more
substantial marginal benefits from receiving assistance (Allen-Arave et al., 2008).
Charitable donations encouraged by mechanisms that evolved to promote
investments in kin should predominately entail older individuals supporting
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causes that benefit their younger relatives, such as grandparents supporting their
grandchildren’s extracurricular activities.
Individuals who expect to meet again for future interactions also have an
incentive to cooperate (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; R. Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). If
individuals can establish and maintain stable arrangements of reciprocal
exchanges of goods and services (Trivers, 1971) or mutual obligations to help in
times of need (A. Aktipis, 2016), cooperation can provide net benefits to paired
helpers. Given human capacities for language and technology, people can
receive vital goods and services from one another as far ranging as emotional
and social support, information, mentoring, protection, labor, childcare, special
skills, shelter, tools, resources, and employment opportunities. Cooperative
partners can also render assistance to buffer one another from unpredictable,
asynchronous shocks caused by sudden injuries, illnesses, losses of livelihood,
losses of resources, or natural disasters (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Cashdan, 1985;
Cronk et al., 2019; Gurven et al., 2000; Wiessner, 1982).
People should attend to cues that their associates care about them
personally (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996) and should only help
associates to the degree that associates can be trusted to give help in return to
guard against exploitation from social ties who accept help and favors but do not
return assistance (R. M. Axelrod, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Stephens,
1996). Experiments find that children as early as age 3 or 5 bestow benefits on
peers that have shown them goodwill in the past (House et al., 2013; Vaish et al.,
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2018). Donors might invest directly in social relationships by giving when a
familiar associate with a personal stake in a cause collects a donation. A
donation collected by an associate with a personal stake in a cause can nurture a
social relationship by conveying a donor’s personal interest in the associate who
collects the donation. If the short-term cost of a donation fosters a long-term
supportive relationship (or helps ensure that a fruitful ongoing social relationship
does not deteriorate), such an investment can provide net rewards to a donor in
the long run.
3.1.3. Donations as investments in social reputation
People can assess one another’s likely beneficence as social partners not
only based on benefits obtained from one another in direct interactions, but also
by attending to one another’s tendencies to bestow benefits on others (Bolton et
al., 2005; Milinski et al., 2002b; Seinen & Schram, 2006; Wedekind &
Braithwaite, 2002). In economics experiments, people prefer to associate with
social partners who have demonstrated a willingness to provide benefits to
others (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Chiang, 2010) and condition their cooperation on
whether or not their partner previously cooperated with third parties (King-Casas
et al., 2005; Milinski et al., 2002b; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002) even when
information regarding prior cooperation only comes as second-hand information
obtained through gossip (Ralf D. Sommerfeld et al., 2007). One way that
individuals might build reputations as capable and willing helpers is by
successfully paying the costs inherent in performing generous acts (Boone,
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1998; Gintis et al., 2001; Roberts, 1998; Zahavi, 1995). Another way is to
routinely carry out unselfish acts that credibly convey to associates that one has
an underlying social preference or emotional disposition to offer help reflexively
and can, therefore, be counted on as a reliable helper (Fehrler & Przepiorka,
2013; Frank, 1988; Hirschleifer, 1987). In contrast, individuals who pursue shortterm selfish gains risk alienating potential friends and may be excluded from
future cooperation (C. A. Aktipis, 2004; Feinberg et al., 2014; Marlowe et al.,
2011; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Yamagishi et al., 1994).
For reputation to play a prominent role in charitable giving, donations need
to occur in social settings where others who interact with a donor on a regular
enough basis for a donor to benefit from their esteem and trust collect, witness,
or learn about the donor’s contributions. Several lines of evidence suggest that
donors feel a motivation to give when familiar associates present requests for
donations. More generous donors are more likely to report being asked by a
personal friend, business associate, or clergy as a general motivation for giving
(Schervish & Havens, 1997) and report more instances of becoming involved
with a charity through a family member, friend, or co-worker (Clerkin et al., 2013).
Likewise, respondents in surveys report a higher likelihood of giving in response
to donation appeals from familiar associates than in response to appeals from
strangers in a vignette study (Bekkers, 2004) and in reports of real responses to
recent appeals (see Chapter 2). Finally, university alumni who have ignored
several mailed donation requests from their alma mater are more likely to give in
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response to a follow-up phone request if their former freshman roommate is in
the pool of solicitors that may have placed the call (Meer, 2011). While it seems
clear that people respond favorably to requests from familiar associates, we do
not know the extent to which giving overall occurs in response to requests from
familiar associates. Relatedly, we do not know the frequency with which donors
give to support social ties with personal stakes in causes or the frequency with
which donors give in social settings where familiar social ties are present to
potentially observe the contributions.
3.1.4. Economic motives
Before delving into the social contexts of donations, we must recognize that
some donations have clear economic incentives. Donors can prudently thin out
clutter by giving unwanted property to charity. Consumption motives entice
purchases of charity-branded products and “thank-you” premiums that charities
offer to donors. Charity raffles for valuable prizes can attract gamblers who
otherwise would not contribute to a cause. Also, U.S. tax code allows generous
tax deductions for households that deduct designated charitable contributions.
Households that itemize deductions only pay (1 - m) for every eligible dollar
transferred to charity, where m is the household’s marginal tax rate. In practice,
some households bear the full gross cost of their donations, while other
households bear a net expense as low as 63.94% of the total price of their
donations. Although tax filers routinely underestimate the extent to which
charitable deductions subsidize their contributions (Goldin and Listokin 2012),

84

some people who receive deductions may give more because they do not bear
the full cost of giving. The fact that charitable donations spike in both quantity
and size during the last week—and especially the last day—of the calendar and
tax year suggest the importance of tax incentives in promoting charitable giving
(Strom, 2009). Changes in tax code can also reveal the importance of tax
incentives in promoting charitable giving. Although most economic indicators
(disposable income, personal consumption expenditures, and personal income)
that often correlate with charitable giving rose 4 to 5% in 2018 over 2017,
charitable giving fell 3.4% after accounting for inflation (Indiana University Lilly
Family School of Philanthropy, 2019). While the S&P 500 did decline 6.2% over
2018 from 2017, some of the decline in giving is probably due to changes in
federal tax policy that in 2018 lowered the marginal tax rates for high-income
households and reduced the number of households itemizing their taxes.
I expect economic motives to account for more giving in contexts where
donors are unlikely to receive social benefits. Conversely economic motives are
likely to play a smaller role in contexts where donors are likely to obtain social
benefits by giving.
3.2. Methods
I interviewed residents of 512 households in person about the donations
made by all members of their economic household over the previous 12 months.
An economic household includes co-resident adults who pool income and share
expenses plus their dependents. To obtain a broad cross-section of respondents,
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I recruited participants from New Mexico State Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) field
office waiting rooms in the greater Albuquerque/Rio Rancho, NM metropolitan
area. Most New Mexicans maintain either a driver’s license or a state ID (which
non-drivers use to enter bars and clubs, purchase alcohol and tobacco products,
open bank accounts, and to write and cash checks) that requires renewal every
four years. At the time of the interviews, these renewals had to be done in person
and were the primary reason people went to an MVD field office.
I selected potential participants at random from MVD waiting rooms by
approaching every person who entered the room and took a number to see an
MVD clerk anytime I was not already engaged with another (potential)
participant. To encourage the participation of non-donors who might be less
enthusiastic than donors to offer their time for a study on charitable giving,
participants were offered $25 (2017 dollars) in immediate cash upon completing
a survey. Individuals had to be at least 18 years old to participate.
3.2.1. Donations
I handed participants cards that listed, first, categories of causes that
people may support (see Table 1.3) and, second, methods by which people
sometimes make charitable donations (see Table 3.1 below). The first prompting,
by category, assists respondents in recalling larger donation amounts (Wilhelm,
2007) while the second prompting, by method, helps respondents remember
small donations that they tend to forget about when only prompted by category
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Table 3.1. Some ways in which people may contribute money or other property
for charitable purposes
A. Paying to attend a charity or other nonprofit evet, whether or not you
actually went
B. Sponsoring someone in an event like a walkathon, marathon, or
charity run
C. Making a one-time contribution during the year to a favorite cause
D. Making regular contributions throughout the year
E. Donating goods or possessions, such as food or clothing
F. Giving in “memorial”
G. Sending amounts directly to health, education, arts, social service,
international organizations, or other non-profit organizations
H. Giving art to a museum
I. Using payroll deduction
J. Giving to churches, temples, synagogues, or mosques
K. By purchasing goods or services sold by a charitable organization to
raise money, such as raffles, bingo, candy, coupon books, or other
items
L. By giving to a door-to-door collector
M. In response to a request from family and friends
N. In response to a request from a co-worker
O. In response to telephone or internet requests
P. In response to appeals made over television or radio
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued). Some ways in which people may contribute money or
other property for charitable purposes
Q. By responding to a request through the mail
R. By approaching an organization on one’s own to make a donation
S. In public cash boxes or collection jars
T. By adding a donation on top of a purchase amount at checkout
U. By giving to a shopping center collector
V. In any other way not listed
W. None of the above

(P. Rooney et al., 2004). Previous surveys using category prompts typically find
that 70% to 80% of people report giving donations in a given year while previous
studies using method prompts typically find that more than 90% of people report
giving donations in a given year (P. Rooney et al., 2004; Wilhelm, 2007). Few
studies use both types of prompts, but a rare study that prompted California
residents to recall giving by using method and category prompts found that 95%
of respondents reported giving charitable donations in a year (P. Rooney et al.,
2004).
The category and method prompts used in the current study included
categories for “none of the above,” and letters preceded all prompts. I cued
participants that “some people give money or goods to charitable causes, while
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others for a variety of good reasons choose not to give” and told them that “we
know that people who give to charity often do not give in every 12-month period.”
I next told participants, “Please do not worry if you did not make a donation in the
specific, restricted time period I am asking about” because “the participation of
non-donors is as valuable to this study as the participation of donors in order to
obtain an accurate picture of people’s giving choices.” I asked respondents to
read off any letter associated with a voluntary charitable contribution of money or
goods a member of the household gave over the previous 12 months. For each
letter a participant called off (other than letters for “none of the above”), I inquired
about how many donations the respondent made and the name(s) of the
nonprofit(s) the contribution(s) supported. If a respondent named the same
organization in response to more than one prompt, I asked participants whether
these were separate donations or repeated promptings of a single donation that
falls within multiple categories.

For each separate donation, I asked donors how they learned about the
campaign they supported. If someone requested the donation or told the donor
about the method that the donor used to give, I asked how (if at all) the donor
knew the advocate who encouraged the donation. I code advocates that
respondents identified with kinship terms as “kin” and code friends, neighbors,
employers, co-workers, acquaintances, or regular attendees of reoccurring social
gatherings that the respondent frequents (such as religious services or club
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meetings) as “familiar associates.” I code advocates identified as strangers or as
paid representatives as “not familiar associates.” Whenever I was unsure if a
respondent knew an advocate personally or not, I asked respondents if they
would recognize the advocate and know how they knew the advocate if they
walked by during the interview. I code advocates who the donor would recognize
for reasons other than the donation request as “familiar associates” and
everyone else as “not familiar associates.”
For donations that were prompted by an advocate other than a paid
representative of the nonprofit, I asked further questions to determine whether
the advocate or a member of the advocate’s immediate family has a personal
stake in the cause. For instance, if a donor gave to a neighbor selling candy bars
to raise money for a youth soccer team, I asked the respondent, “Why do you
think your neighbor is interested in selling candy bars to raise money for youth
soccer?” Then if needed, “Do you know if your neighbor or anyone in your
neighbor’s family plays on the team, coaches the team, or is otherwise involved
with the team?” For a request from a co-worker seeking sponsorship in a charity
run for cancer, I asked, “Why do you think your co-worker wanted to run to raise
money for a cancer association?”, and then if needed, “Are you aware of any way
that your co-worker or a member of your co-worker’s family has been touched by
or affected by cancer personally?” I count donations given in response to appeals
from non-household relatives with personal stakes in the cause as “kin support”
and donations given in response to appeals from friends and acquaintances with
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personal stakes in the cause as “social relationship investments.” These
measures do not capture an advocate’s stake in a cause per se but capture
donations that a donor gives believing that the gift supports a cause that
personally involves the social tie.
3.2.2. Social giving and extra-network giving
I asked participants if anyone else was present when they made each
donation and if so, whether the participant can identify anyone else present. As
above, I code any bystanders identified as friends, neighbors, co-workers,
acquaintances, or regular attendees of reoccurring social gatherings that the
respondent frequents as “familiar associates.” I code donations solicited by,
collected by, or given in the presence of at least one familiar non-kin associate as
“social giving” and code donations that are not witnessed by, collected by, or
requested by anyone the donor knows personally as “extra-network giving.”
3.2.3. Measures of gross amounts transferred and amounts expended
For each donation, I asked whether the donor gave money or property. For
monetary donations, I asked for the amount given. For property donations, I
asked what the item was and whether the item was initially acquired for personal
use or to donate. If the donor initially acquired the good for personal use, I asked
how much the respondent would accept for the item at the end of the day at a
garage sale. If the item was bought expressly for a donation, I asked how much
the donor paid for the item. I measure the gross transfer value, dg, of each
donation as the dollar amount given for monetary contributions, the end-of-day
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garage sale value for donations of used goods, and the purchase price of new
goods the donor purchased with the intent to give away.
The full gross transfer value of a donation, dg, exceeds the amount a donor
forgoes on behalf of a greater cause when a donor purchases a wanted charitybranded product, claims a tax deduction, or gives away unwanted personal
property. I subtract p + (c * m) from the gross transfer value, dg, of a donation to
obtain the donor’s expenditure on the donation, de, where p is the price
respondents would be willing to pay for utilized “thank-you” premiums, c is the
amount respondents claim on taxes for the donation, and m is the household’s
marginal tax rate. To obtain measures of p, I asked participants for every
donation they reported if they received any goods or services in return for the
donation, such as a “thank-you” gift, admission to an event, or entry in a drawing
for a prize. If the donor received a premium, I asked whether the premium was
given upfront with a donation appeal or was given after a donation as a “thank
you” in return for the donor’s contribution. I also asked what the premium was
and what the donor did with the premium. If a premium was given contingent on
the donor contributing and a member of the donor’s household consumed, used,
displayed, or gifted the premium to someone else, I asked how much the donor
would be willing to pay for the premium in a store which I use as the measure of
p. If the premium involved a drawing for something worth more than the cost of
the donation, I set p equal to the entire donation value since the gamble of
winning something more valuable than the initial investment may have motivated
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the donation. To capture tax deductions of charitable contributions, I asked
respondents if they itemize their taxes, “that is, use the 1040 long-form Schedule
A” to claim deductions for property tax, interest payments, medical expenses, or
charitable contributions. For households that itemize, I asked whether they claim
a deduction for charitable contributions and if so, to indicate the amount that they
would claim for each donation, c. Following the interviews, participants filled out
private questionnaires to capture marital status, ages of all household members,
and earnings information. With this demographic information, I calculate each
household’s marginal tax rate, m, using the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s TAXSIM program (Feenberg & Coutts, 1993).
I asked participants who reported donations of used possessions what they
would have done with the goods if they had not donated them. If the donated
goods would have otherwise been thrown away, freely given away elsewhere, or
stored without using, I treat the transfer as a prudent reduction of clutter rather
than an expenditure on charity and set the de value of the donation to zero. For
instance, a donation of a business suit may involve a donor giving up a work
outfit to help someone less fortunate find a job or may reflect a donor prudently
freeing up closet space by clearing out an old suit that has fallen out of fashion or
that no longer fits well. A suit given for any reason involves a transfer to charity
that I count in a household’s gross transfer total, dg, but only the gift of a suit that
the donor would have continued wearing if not for the donation involves an
expenditure (or personal sacrifice) on behalf of a greater cause that I include in a
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household’s expenditure on charity, de. This measure of a household’s
expenditure on charity may be thought of as a lower limit since a donation of
even unwanted property may involve more effort than simply throwing the
unwanted property away or may entail a cost in lost revenue from not selling the
item.
I calculate household total annual gross transfers to charity and household
total annual expenditures on charity as the sum of all dg and de values,
respectively, given by all household members over the previous 12 months. I
calculate annual household totals for five categories of giving—all donations, kin
support, social relationship investments, social giving, and extra-network giving.
3.3. Results
Table 3.2 (below) summarizes annual household transfers to charity, dg,
and annual household expenditures on charity, de, for the five categories of
interest. Participation measures in Table 3.2 indicate the percentage of
households that make at least one transfer or expenditure within the category in
a year. The measures of amounts given represent the mean and median (plus
interquartile range) dollar values that participating households transfer or expend
within the category per year. Income shares indicate the mean and median (plus
interquartile range) percentages of after-tax income that households transfer to
charity or expend on charity. Mean and median giving shares represent the
portion of a household’s total giving that falls within the category. Distributions of
donors are positively skewed with households that give large donations having
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pronounced effects on the mean values in Table 3.2 (below). The means are not
representative of a typical household’s charitable giving but I present the means
for comparison with other datasets that report means given. I focus on the
median and interquartile range (IQR) values to describe typical household giving
patterns.
3.3.1. Total transfers and expenditures
As Table 3.2 (below) indicates, the majority, 94.31% of households transfer
money or possessions to charitable causes over the course of 12 months. Most
transfers involve money, with contributions of money outnumbering donations of
possessions 10:1. Among households that give donations, the median gross
amount transferred to charity in a year is $571 (IQR = $148 - $1,655, 2017 US
dollars). Variation among households is immense and positively skewed, with
18.46% of households transferring less than $100 per year and 2.07%
transferring tens of thousands of dollars per year. Even after accounting for
differences in income by measuring transfers as percentages of household
income, the distribution of household transfers to charity is positively skewed with
the least generous quartile transferring less than 0.50% of yearly income and the
most generous quartile transferring at least 4.79% of yearly income. The median
household transfers 1.42% of income to charity.
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Table 3.2. Household totals given to charity1

All donations
Participation
Mean amount given
Mean income share4
Median amount given5
Median income share4,5
Kin support6
Participation
Mean amount given
Mean giving share7
Median amount given5
Median giving share7,5
Social relationship
investment8
Participation
Mean amount given
Mean giving share7
Median amount given5
Median giving share7,5
Social giving9
Participation
Mean amount given
Mean giving share7
Median amount given5
Median giving share7,5
Extra-network giving10
Participation
Mean amount given
Mean giving share7
Median amount given5
Median giving share7,5

Transfers (dg)2

Expenditures (de)3

94.31%
$1,839.48
3.73%
$571.07 (148.26 - 1,655.20)
1.42% (0.42 - 4.79)

89.78%
$1,371.64
2.79%
$302.48 (70.06 - 1,181.79)
0.79% (0.18 - 2.86)

12.28%
$282.69
2.30%
$43.93 (25.10 - 119.23)
0% (0 - 0)

11.31%
$211.86
2.55%
$22.86 (10.97 - 50.20)
0% (0 - 0)

58.81%
$1,266.51
30.92%
$251.02 (62.76 - 1,251.33)
10.71% (0 - 63.83)

56.55%
$1,068.87
38.21%
$203.95 (32.82 - 1,074.72)
18.09% (0 - 82.06)

78.93%
$1,230.53
54.77%
$313.78 (81.27 - 1,084.72)
61.27% (14.29 - 94.20)

75.57%
$1,001.17
63.28%
$204.10 (43.85 - 880.29)
84.68% (19.05 - 99.92)

75.21%
$707.15
39.44%
$221.21 (50.20 - 661.91)
27.20% (2.16 - 75.16)

61.28%
$493.92
31.47%
$69.35 (18.83 - 339.79)
7.91% (0 - 67.62)

1

Amounts given are in 2017 US dollars and are conditional on participation, 2 Gross transfers include the total
dollar amount given in monetary contributions, the end-of-day garage sale value for donations of used goods,
and the purchase price of new goods the donor purchased with the intent to give away, 3 Expenditures reflect the
total amount given to charity after subtracting the value of wanted charity-branded products, subtracting the
product of the amount claimed on taxes for donations and the marginal tax rate, removing gifts of unwanted
personal property, and removing entries in games of chance, 4Income shares denote the percentage of after-tax
(or disposable) income given to charity, 5Values in parenthesis are interquartile ranges (Q1 – Q3), 6Kin support
includes all donations given to support a cause that a non-household relative has a personal stake in, 7Giving
shares denote the percentage of giving to a specific category, 8Social relationship investment is a subset of social
giving. It includes all donations given to support a cause that a friend or acquaintance has a personal stake in,
9
Social giving includes all donations solicited by, collected by, or given in the presence of at least one friend or
acquaintance. Kin support and social giving are not mutually exclusive since kin support can be given in the
presence of familiar associates, 10Extra-network giving includes all donations that are not witnessed by, collected
by, or requested by anyone the donor knows personally
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Gross transfer values, dg, overstate a donor’s altruism when donors
purchase premiums, receive tax breaks, or give unwanted clutter. 8.43% of
donation events involve the purchase of charity-branded goods that offset a
portion of the donation cost. Although 18.38% of households that give donations
and itemize their taxes do not claim any deduction for their charitable
contributions, 40.21% of households in the sample that give donations do claim
tax deductions for their charitable contributions. Many itemizers who claim
donations only claim their more substantial gifts, leaving many smaller donations
unclaimed. Other respondents report that they intentionally under-value their
charitable donations when filing taxes because they fear that the full deductions
might be difficult to prove to an IRS auditor or might even invite an IRS audit. In
total, 22% of households that claim tax deductions for charitable contributions do
not claim the full value of their donations. On the other hand, respondents from
13% of households claim more in taxes than they give, either because they claim
much more for donated possessions than they would accept for the items at the
end of the day at a garage sale or—as some respondents readily admitted to
me—they intentionally claim more in charitable contributions than they give to
inflate their deductions. Among households that claim deductions for charitable
gifts, the median claim was for $1,041 (IQR = $457 - $3,935) in donations for the
year. 7.69% of donation events involve transfers of possessions that the donor
actively wanted to clear out or that the donor would have just stored without
using. Another 0.99% of donation events involve charity drawings. As seen in
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Table 3.2 (above), excluding these donations leaves 89.78% of households
making expenditures to support nonprofits in a year.
In total, purchases of premiums, entries in charity drawings, tax deductions,
and transfers of unwanted clutter offset an average of 37.91% (SD = 32.48%) of
the dollars that a household in the sample transfers to charity. After removing
purchases of premiums, drawings for prizes, tax breaks, and transfers of
unwanted property, households that are left making expenditures on charity
expend a median of $302 (IQR = $70 - $1,182) per year. As with the distribution
of transfers to charity, the distribution of expenditures is highly positively skewed
even after accounting for income differences by measuring expenditures as a
percentage of income. The most generous quartile of households expend 2.86%
or more of their income on charity while the least generous quartile of
households expend 0.18% or less of their income on charity. The median
household expenditure on charity is 0.79% of income.
3.3.2. Kin support and social relationship investment
Participants rarely reported giving in response to requests from relatives.
Only 17.43% of households support a cause that a relative told the donor about,
and as seen in Table 3.2 (above) under kin support, only 12.28% of households
make a transfer to support a relative who has a personal stake in a cause. Yet,
decision-makers in households that transfer resources to nonprofits that benefit
kin are significantly older (mean = 48.03 ± 16.32) than decision-makers in
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households that give donations but do not give to nonprofits that benefit kin
(mean = 42.18 ± 14.74), two-sample t(469) = 5.86, p = .004.
With purchases of premiums, tax deductions, and transfers of unwanted
property removed, only 11.31% of households make an expenditure to support a
relative who has a personal stake in a charitable cause. Again, decision-makers
in households that make expenditures to benefit causes that relatives have
personal stakes in are significantly older (mean = 48.60 ± 16.56) than decisionmakers in households that do not make expenditures to help causes that
relatives have personal stakes in (42.17 ± 14.71), two-sample t(469) = 3.05, p =
.002. On average, households that support relatives by giving donations to
causes that relatives have personal stakes in expend about half as much on kin
support as they transfer ($44 median transfer, IQR = $25 - $119 vs. $22.86
median expenditure, IQR = $11 - $50). Donations that benefit kin often involve
donors purchasing premiums (hence the difference in amounts transferred and
amounts expended) to support activities that engage their grandchildren, nieces,
or nephews. Caution should be taken with these results, however, given that
donations to causes that involve relatives are rare and contribute few
observations to this study.
It is much more common for donors to support friends and acquaintances
with personal stakes in causes. As seen in Table 3.2 (above), most households,
58.81%, make a transfer to charity in response to an appeal from a familiar
associate who has a personal stake in the cause. Among households that give
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charitable donations, a median of 10.71% (IQR = 0% - 63.83%) of the dollars that
household members transfer to charity are collected by someone with a personal
stake in the cause who the donor knows personally. Removing transfers of
unwanted property and entries in drawings for valuable prizes leaves 56.55% of
households making an expenditure to support a friend or acquaintance with a
personal stake in a cause. When we look at what household members are willing
to expend on charity, an even larger share of their donation dollars go to support
friends and acquaintances. A median of 18.09% (IQR = 0% - 82.06%) of the
dollars that households expend on charity are given in response to appeals from
familiar associates who have personal stakes in the supported causes.
3.3.3. Social giving and extra-network giving
Most donations that participants give are collected through friends,
neighbors, local churches, workplace fund drives, and service clubs where
donors are in the company of familiar associates. As seen under social giving in
Table 3.2 (above), 78.93% of households give at least one donation that at least
one person the donor knows personally is likely to know about first-hand. Indeed,
over half of the dollars that most households transfer to charity are collected by,
solicited by, or given in the presence of at least one friend or acquaintance of the
donor. Among households that give to charitable causes, a median of 61.27%
(IQR = 14.29% - 94.20%) of the dollars that household members transfer to
charity are given in social settings that involve a familiar associate as a collector,
requester, or bystander to the donation.
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When we focus more narrowly on donations that involve donors bearing a
cost to help, most households, 75.57%, make expenditures on charity that are
collected by, requested by, or given in the presence of at least one person the
donor knows personally. Indeed, the larger share, 84.68% (IQR = 19.05% 99.92%), of the dollars that most households expend on charity are collected by,
requested by, or given in the presence of someone the donor knows.
As the extra-network giving statistics in Table 3.2 (above) show, most
households, 75.21%, also transfer resources to charity in circumstances where
friends and acquaintances do not collect, request, or witness the transfer firsthand. A median of 27.02% (IQR = 2.16% - 75.16%) of the dollars that
households transfer to charity are transferred without a familiar associate
collecting, requesting, or witnessing the transfer. Extra-network giving is less
prevalent when we only consider donations that involve household members
making an expenditure to benefit a cause. A slight majority, 61.28%, of
households make expenditures to support causes without the involvement of
anyone the donor knows personally. As a percentage of dollars expended on
charity, however, extra-network giving makes up a small portion of household
donations. A median share of only 7.91% (IQR = 0% - 67.62%) of the dollars that
households expend on charity are given in social settings where it is highly
unlikely that the donation could be collected by or witnessed by someone the
donor knows personally. Of course, variation among households is tremendous
and 29.36% of households that make charitable expenditures give most of their
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dollars in social settings where their expenditure to support a common good is
not collected by or observed by anyone the donor knows personally.
3.4. Discussion
A clear majority of households voluntarily support common goods by giving
charitable donations. When we raise the bar to only count giving that entails an
expenditure above and beyond purchases of premiums, entries in drawings for
valuable prizes, tax breaks, and transfers of unwanted property, close to 90% of
households expend resources to provision public interests.
The most common category of charitable giving is social giving. Donors
commonly give during social gatherings, neighborly visits, religious services,
workplace fund drives, and hobby group meetings where familiar associates are
present to collect, request, or observe the donor’s generosity. Social giving
accounts for over half of the dollars the median household transfers to charity.
When we take out purchases of “thank you” premiums, entries in drawings, tax
deductions, and transfers of unwanted property to get at what households
actually expend on charity, a substantially larger share—over 80%—of the
dollars the median household expends on charity are given in social settings
where familiar associates are likely to gain first-hand knowledge of a donor’s
generosity. The extent to which giving occurs in social settings where familiar
associates request, collect, or are present to observe a donor’s contributions
suggests that social reputation plays a significant role in encouraging donors to
contribute.

102

Social giving sometimes involves support for friends and acquaintances
who have personal stakes in a cause. Over half of households give at least one
donation in response to an appeal from a friend or acquaintance who has a
personal stake in a cause. Such contributions may reflect direct investments in
social relationships. Donations to charities or services that aid valued associates
provide an exceptionally effective avenue for donors to signal their interest and
willingness to help friends out. Beneficiaries of donations should be particularly
attentive audiences to generous acts (Boone, 1998), and people can be
expected to pay particular attention as to whether their current and potential
friends are willing to help when able (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).
Few households make expenditures on charitable causes to support
relatives with personal stakes in a cause. But, as we might expect under kin
selection theory, households that provide kin support tend to contain decisionmakers that are older than the decision-makers in households that do not provide
kin support. I did not collect detailed enough data to systematically examine
specific characteristics of supported kin or of donor’s relationships to supported
kin, but anecdotally, donors who reported kin support were often providing
support of activities that involved their grandchildren, nieces, and nephews.
Over half of households also give donations without a familiar associate
collecting, requesting, or witnessing the contribution. While such giving
comprises a fair share of transfers to charity, when we narrow our focus to
donations that involve a household expenditure, households expend relatively
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small amounts without someone the donor knows personally collecting,
requesting, or being present to witness the donor’s generosity. These donations
often involve donors giving small amounts from their purses or pockets. The
median share of dollars expended on charity without the involvement of familiar
associates is less than 10%. Yet, the mean share of 31.47% attests to the fact
that some households expend substantial amounts on charity without the
involvement of social ties. For over a quarter of households, the greater part of
giving occurs in settings where no one the donor knows personally is likely to be
aware of the donation, at least not first-hand.
3.4.1. Implications for other studies
Studies often examine tax filing data to study household giving to charity.
Such data are useful in providing measures for large numbers of households, but
we should use caution in extrapolating from tax return data to actual amounts
household’s give. Although other studies have found that only 7.2% of tax filers
overreport their charitable contributions (Slemrod 1989), the findings here echo
others (see Joulfain and Rider 2004) that tax return data may not be reliable at
capturing household contributions to charity. Respondents were often candid with
me that they intentionally undervalue their charitable deductions to safeguard
against audits or exaggerate their donations to inflate their deductions.
Economic and psychology experiments examining generosity routinely
focus on short-term anonymous stranger interactions despite theoretical
expectations that long-term social connections should play a key role in
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promoting cooperation. Researchers often idealize charitable giving as people
sending off funds to help disadvantaged recipients they will never meet. The
analysis here reveals that even charitable giving often involves donors giving to
friends and acquaintances who are stakeholders in a cause. Further, most
charitable donations are given in social contexts where people a donor has longterm social relationships with are likely to discover the donor’s gifts. Experiments
allow us to draw invaluable causal inferences by isolating single factors of
interest but can have limited applicability to the behaviors found outside the lab
that we ultimately seek to explain (Levitt & List, 2007; Tognetti et al., 2012).
Popular conceptions of charitable giving as donors anonymously assisting
strangers without either party knowing the identity of the other have encouraged
theorists to search for pathways to altruism not requiring reciprocation (see for
example, Bereczkei et al., 2007; Boone, 1998; Frank, 1988; Milinski et al., 2002b;
Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2016; Roberts, 1998; Sober & Wilson, 1998). Yet, the data
presented here show that a fair slice of giving involves donors giving
contributions that are collected by familiar associates with personal stakes in a
cause. A much greater share of charitable giving involves donors giving in social
contexts where they are in the company of familiar associates. For example,
people give at church or club meetings where they might want to demonstrate
that they are non free-riding on services they utilize. Employees give at work fund
drives where they might want to show their co-workers that they are productive
members of the team. While people do sometimes cooperate in anonymous one-
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off interactions (Camerer, 2003; Capraro et al., 2014; Dawes & Thaler, 1988;
Gurven et al., 2008; Henrich & Henrich, 2010), most cooperative interactions
involve interactions with long-term associates. Many cooperative acts that
primarily involve strangers are not very costly (such as holding a door open for
the next person), are mutually-beneficial (such as agreeing to drive on the righthand side of the road), or are enforced by third-party institutions (such as laws or
money). Likewise, people sometimes give to charity without likely reputational
gains, but in general, such gifts make up a small portion of charitable giving. In
this respect, charitable giving is more like other forms of cooperation than we
may first imagine.
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CHAPTER 4. DO CHARITABLE DONATIONS BUY FRIENDS?
GENEROSITY AND SOCIAL SUPPORT GO HAND IN HAND.

There is a magnet in your heart that will attract true friends. That magnet
is unselfishness, thinking of others first . . . When you learn to live for
others, they will live for you.
— Paramahansa Yogananda, August 20, 1939 address at Encinitas,
California
4.1. Links between charitable giving and social capital
Charitable giving and social relationships can relate to one another in many
ways. First, social ties may encourage charitable donations. For example, people
may learn about worthy causes through social interactions with their friends and
acquaintances. People may also encounter donation requests and social
pressure to give through social ties who become involved in fundraising
campaigns. Second, charitable donations may foster social relationships. Donors
may gain admiration from associates who observe or learn about contributions
that donors make to charities. People may even invest in social relationships by
giving donations when friends and acquaintances collect donations for a favorite
cause. Finally, personality traits, sentiments, emotions, and values that
encourage people to give to charity may also endear them to friends and
acquaintances. People who feel more empathy or who take more satisfaction
from helping others may give charitable donations more freely and may invest
more in interpersonal relationships with their peers. Any of these pathways can
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lead to correlations in measures of charitable giving and measures of social
relationships.
Research exploring links between social ties and charitable giving has
traditionally focused on the effect that social relationships have in promoting
giving and has primarily neglected how donor generosity might affect social
relationships. These studies find that measures of social capital positively
correlate with charitable giving. For example, people who give more to charity
tend to have more social interactions, such as having meals with others,
attending events with others, or having conversations with others
(Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2008; Cappellari et al., 2011; Choi & Dinitto, 2012;
Forbes & Zampelli, 2010). Studies also find that people who give more to charity
tend to have more bridging social ties (E. Brown & Ferris, 2007; Leonard et al.,
2010; L. Wang & Graddy, 2008; Wiepking & Maas, 2009). Bridging social ties are
measured as knowing people with given characteristics, such as someone who
owns a vacation home, is of a particular ethnicity, has a specified occupation, or
can offer advice on a given issue. Although Cappellari, Ghinetti, and Turati
(2011) note that people who have less concern for others may give less to charity
and may also develop fewer social ties, researchers typically attribute increases
in charitable giving to increases in social capital. A common conclusion is that
social ties increase giving by increasing a potential donor’s awareness and
knowledge of ways to give (Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2008; Bryant et al., 2003;
Leonard et al., 2010; Putnam, 1995; L. Wang & Graddy, 2008; Wiepking & Maas,
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2009). Researchers also attribute increases in giving to social ties that expand a
potential donor’s trust and respect for others (E. Brown & Ferris, 2007; Glaeser et
al., 2002; L. Wang & Graddy, 2008).
Evolutionary theory, however, suggests that the degree of generosity that
people express is as likely to influence the composition of their social
relationships as to be an outcome of their social relationships. Humans are a
highly social species, and people rely on social partners for welfare-enhancing
goods and services. The reputations that people acquire as willing and capable
helpers might affect their ability to establish and maintain mutually beneficial
social relationships. If so, generosity, charitable giving, social investments made
in friends, and social support received from friends are all likely to be interrelated.
People with more social ties may receive more charitable requests and may face
more social pressure to give, which can lead to more charitable giving.
Meanwhile, people who give more to charity may be more likable. Economics
experiments find that people put more trust in and give more generously to
partners who publicly donate a portion of their study earnings to charity (Albert et
al., 2007; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Milinski et al., 2002b). More generous
donors may endear themselves to friends by giving donations more often when
friends become involved in fundraisers for a favorite cause. Less directly, traits
that encourage people to give charitable donations may also encourage them to
share their resources, time, and talents in other ways that endear them to their
friends and acquaintances.
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4.1.1. The importance of social relationships for humans
Our ancestors became mutually dependent on social partners for survival
and reproduction. People have evolved capacities for social exchanges and
collaborations to obtain food in skill-intensive foraging environments (Kaplan et
al., 2000; Tomasello et al., 2012), to care for the young over extended juvenile
periods (Hrdy, 2009), and to acquire the knowledge needed to make livings in
diverse environments (Boyd et al., 2011; Tomasello, 1999). In contemporary
small-scale subsistence economies, people still rely on one another for
alloparental care (K. Hill & Hurtado, 2009; Kramer, 2010; A. E. Page, 2016),
cooperative food acquisition (Alvard, 2012; K. R. Hill, 2002), food provisioning
(Gurven, 2004), care in times of sickness or injury (Sugiyama, 2004), and social
transmission of skills and knowledge (Henrich & Henrich, 2010). Likewise, in
large-scale market economies, social connections are associated with increased
earnings (Baron & Markman, 2003; Seidel et al., 2000), resilience in natural
disasters (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015), better health (Cohen et al., 2003; Ho, 2016),
and lower mortality (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010; Steptoe et al., 2013).
Human capacities for language and technology allow people to exchange
crucial goods and services with one another as extensive as social and
emotional support, knowledge, skills, mentoring, resources, tools, manufactured
goods, labor, shelter, protection, and employment prospects. The breadth of
goods and services that people exchange provides individuals with reoccurring
opportunities to incur relatively low personal costs to confer comparatively large
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benefits on others who will have opportunities to reciprocate. Paired individuals
can each obtain net gains from these opportunities by forming friendships and
alliances that foster repeated reciprocal exchanges of favors (Trivers, 1971).
Additionally, people can collaborate to attain valuable goods, services, and
information that no individual could acquire alone.
Individuals can also band together to buffer against unpredictable,
asynchronous shocks by establishing arrangements of mutual obligation to assist
one another in times of need (A. Aktipis et al., 2016). If friends and allies render
need-based assistance to one another—whether based on reciprocity or pact to
assist when needed—these social relationships can help people through
illnesses, injuries, accidents, shortfalls, and sudden losses (Cashdan, 1985;
Cronk et al., 2019; Gurven et al., 2000; Wiessner, 1982). Such provisioning can
be lifesaving and would have been especially crucial in ancestral environments
that lacked hospitals, insurance companies, and institutional safety nets (Hublin,
2009; Kaplan et al., 2000; Sugiyama, 2004).
The diversity of goods and services that people exchange also creates
unique challenges. First, exchange partners face the difficulty of reckoning
exchange values of vastly different goods and services over extended time
scales. Second, exchange partners face uncertainty over what they may need
and who might best provide it in the future. Additionally, large social groupings
(K. R. Hill et al., 2011) present people with dozens or even hundreds of potential
exchange partners. To overcome these challenges, people tend to form close
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friendships within which partners freely offer help to one another without tracking
the short-term costs and benefits of each exchange (Clark & Mills, 2011;
Hruschka, 2010; Silk, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).
These mutually-beneficial partnerships are only viable if individuals avoid
exploitive pairings with associates who accept assistance but do not give
assistance (R. M. Axelrod, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Stephens, 1996).
This threat of exploitation gives people an incentive to evaluate their associates’
propensities to provide help (Hruschka, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). People
can assess one another’s helpfulness through direct interactions and by
observing or, given the uniquely human capacity for language, hearing of a
peer’s treatment of third parties (Alexander, 1987; Enquist & Leimar, 1993;
Feinberg et al., 2014; Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Piazza & Bering, 2008; E. A.
Smith, 2010; R. D Sommerfeld et al., 2008; Trivers, 1971). Avoidance of a
reputation for selfishness may be essential for establishing and maintaining close
friendships that sustain mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services.
Individuals who acquire reputations for free-riding or exploitive tendencies
are likely to face difficulty finding trusting exchange partners and collaborators
(C. A. Aktipis, 2004; Feinberg et al., 2014; Marlowe et al., 2011; Yamagishi et al.,
1994). Such stigma may even bring wider ostracism or punishment (Fehr &
Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006; Krasnow et al., 2015; Mathew & Boyd,
2011). Meanwhile, individuals can enhance their appeal as friends by
demonstrating their capability to successfully sustain the costs of generous acts
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(Boone, 1998; Gintis et al., 2001; Roberts, 1998; Zahavi, 1995). Unselfish acts
may also credibly convey to others that a helper has an underlying social
preference or emotional disposition to offer assistance reflexively and can,
therefore, be counted on as a reliable helper (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Frank,
1988; Hirschleifer, 1987).
Generosity may even serve as a form of social “insurance.” People may
take a vested interest in the welfare of a friend who provides valuable goods and
services. In this way, generous individuals can become indispensable associates
who are helped by their friends in times of need when help can be fateful (Tooby
& Cosmides, 1996). In traditional small-scale subsistence societies, people who
contribute more to community goods have larger support networks (Lyle & Smith,
2014), hunters who provide more food have broader and healthier social support
groups (Wiessner, 2002), and people who share more food receive more
provisioning from others during illnesses (Gurven et al., 2000). If these theories
are widely applicable to human behavior, we might expect to find similar
relationships between generosity and social support in large-scale industrialized
societies.
4.1.2. Charitable contributions as social investments in friendships
The pressure to maintain a reputation as a capable and willing friend may
encourage people to give charitable donations when their associates present
charitable appeals. Fundraising campaigns often leverage social relationships
and social pressure by asking supporters to collect donations from their friends,
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acquaintances, co-workers, and neighbors (see Chapter 3). For example, charity
events operate by having participants recruit their friends as sponsors. Likewise,
online donation drives frequently spread with people sending requests to their
social media contacts. Meanwhile, children’s social clubs and sports teams often
enlist the children’s families to sell trinkets or sweets above market value to their
co-workers and neighbors. Business associates may also extend invitations for
charity galas. Sometimes, friends and acquaintances become involved in
fundraisers because they or a member of their family utilize the services of a
charity. Such stakeholder appeals are common for youth extracurricular
activities, emotional support groups, veteran's organizations, disease research
organizations, civil rights organizations, and religious causes.
Donations handed over to friends or acquaintances collecting donations for
causes that they value enough to ask others to support can indicate a donor’s
commitment to the social relationship or to ideals shared with the friend. When a
friend or acquaintance seeks a donation for a personally relevant cause, a
donation may even serve as a direct social investment in the relationship. Such
cues and investments can be important for maintaining friendships. Recall that
close friends tend not to calculate the short-term costs and benefits of every
exchange, but instead, attend to cues that a chosen friend cares about them
(Clark & Mills, 2011; Hruschka, 2010; Silk, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). As a
result, the symbolic gesture of donations showing that a donor cares about their
friends’ chosen causes may play a more significant role in fostering social
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relationships than the material costs and benefits of charitable transfers.
Symbolic gift exchanges of objects of questionable utility that people appear to
exchange to reinforce social relationships may have a long evolutionary history.
Hxaro, the system of symbolic gift exchange of ostrich eggshell beads between
Ju/’hoãn individuals in southern Africa’s Kalahari Desert appears to date back
into the late Middle Stone Age (Stewart et al., 2020).
Each social relationship a person has introduces more occasions for a
friend or acquaintance to make an appeal for a donation on behalf of a charitable
cause. People with more social ties tend to receive more charitable requests (E.
Brown & Ferris, 2007; Putnam, 2000; L. Wang & Graddy, 2008). People who
receive more charitable requests tend to give more donations (Wiepking & Maas,
2009), and requests from someone a potential donor knows personally tend to be
very effective at eliciting donations (see Chapter 2). As a result, we might expect
that people with more friends will give more to charity in response to requests
from friends.
Yet, some appeals from friends and acquaintances may apply less social
pressure than others. Social ties involved in fundraisers may present indirect or
passive appeals, or they may ask directly for donations. Indirect and passive
appeals include requests addressed to a group of potential donors, appeals to
give sometime in the future, and requests made remotely through email or a
note. People can often dismiss indirect and passive appeals without drawing
attention by merely taking no action. Direct requests, on the other hand, occur
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when a requester puts a potential donor on the spot to acknowledge a donation
appeal with an overt reply. Face-to-face or phone requests that explicitly ask
individuals to answer in real-time with a decision to give or not (e.g., “Can I count
on you for a gift today?”) do not offer potential donors an easy or inconspicuous
way out. Someone who turns down a direct appeal from a friend or acquaintance
must respond to their friend or acquaintance with a flat refusal or an excuse.
People who are more comfortable voicing such refusals or excuses to their
friends and acquaintances might find themselves with fewer friends willing to
invest in a social relationship with them. Meanwhile, people who have more
friends who can be readily counted on to provide social investment may be more
likely to give when their friends present direct requests. This giving can result
from people responding to opportunities to show their appreciation for the
support of their generous friends or because people feel pressure to return
assistance to their generous friends. The preceding discussion leads to the
prediction that people who have more (fewer) friends who can be counted on in a
time of need will give more (less) in response to direct appeals for charitable
donations from their friends and acquaintances.
4.1.3. Charitable contributions as general generosity that attracts friends
Donors also give donations in settings where their associates and friends
do not solicit, collect, or directly observe their gifts. People who are more prone
to act on personality traits, emotions, cognitions, or values that move them to
give donations with only a remote possibility of reputational gain may help others
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more generally without needing assurance of immediate recognition. After all, the
proximate cognitions, sentiments, and values that encourage people to give to
charity did not evolve explicitly to prompt people to give charitable donations (see
Chapter 1). Rather, people who feel rewarded from giving charitable donations in
private and anonymous contexts may feel similarly rewarded from sharing their
time, resources, and talents with others more generally without needing others to
know. Giving to charity has been linked to other forms of benevolence.
Participants in an economics experiment who give part of an endowment to
charity also report that they would give back more to another participant in an
exchange game despite having less to give back than non-donors (Fehrler &
Przepiorka, 2013). People who give more to charity tend to have extensive moral
obligations (Einolf, 2010), to trust others more (Brooks, 2005; E. Brown & Ferris,
2007) to exhibit higher levels of sympathy, empathy, and helpfulness (E. Brown &
Ferris, 2007; Sargeant et al., 2000), and to display greater benevolence in
general (Hubbard, Harbaugh, Srivastava, Degras, and Mayr 2016).
While individuals might build social capital through generosity that
associates and friends are sure to know about, individuals who act with routine
generosity may even more effectively acquire social capital. In comparison to
overt generosity that associates and (potential) friends might devalue as
calculated ploys to be seen in a good light (Andrews, 2001; Barclay & Willer,
2007; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Simpson & Willer, 2008), serendipitously
discovered generosity more credibly indicates a helper’s benevolent nature.
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Associates who detect generosity that is given freely without any apparent
immediate return can have more confidence in a helper’s propensity or mindset
to willingly and reliably help—especially when the helper’s generosity is only
revealed by happenstance (see Alexander, 1987; Frank, 1988). Many, and
indeed most, of a broadly helpful person’s kind acts may remain out of view to
most, or even all, of the helper’s peers. But broadly helpful people who share
their time, resources, and talents in a wide range of circumstances and contexts
may do so with enough regularity that their (potential) friends on occasion, do
notice. Strangers meeting face-to-face in a lab can predict one another’s play in
pre-announced Prisoner’s Dilemma games with better accuracy than chance
(Brosig, 2002; Frank et al., 1993; Sparks et al., 2015). Surely associates and
friends who know much more about one another’s actions, tendencies, and
personalities are even more adept than strangers meeting briefly in a lab better
at inferring one another’s likelihood of cooperating or cheating in social
dilemmas. Thus, I predict that people who give more to charity in contexts where
their donations are not solicited, collected, or observed by their friends will
receive more social investment from their friends. The proposal here is that
proximate personality traits, sentiments, emotions, and values that encourage
someone to give donations without needing recognition are qualities that build
social capital by making the donor more likable.
To explore possible paths of causation in links between charitable
donations and social ties, I examine amounts that people expend on charity in
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response to requests from their friends and acquaintances separately from
amounts that people expend on charity without the involvement of their social
contacts. I explore how these charitable expenditures relate to the number of
close friends that people can name—and especially close friends who the
respondent believes to be dependable helpers in a time of need. First, I examine
whether or not people who have more friends in the local community give more
to charity in response to passive and indirect appeals from their friends and
acquaintances. This analysis gets at whether or not people give more to charity
as a result of learning about more worthwhile causes by having more friends.
Next, I examine whether or not people who believe they have more friends in the
local community that can be counted on in a time of need give more to charity in
response to direct requests from friends and acquaintances. This analysis seeks
to illuminate whether people who receive more social support receive more social
pressure to give or alternatively, whether people who are more likely to turn down
charitable requests from friends and aquaintances receive less social support.
Finally, I examine whether people who give more to charity independent of social
pressure from friends and acquaintances have more friends, and especially
friends they believe they can count on in a time of need. This analysis seeks to
determine whether generosity that gets expressed as charitable giving is
associated with traits that make people more likable.

119

4.2. Methods
I surveyed 512 participants in-person to obtain measures of the charitable
donations they made over the previous 12 months, their social support networks,
and household demographics. To get a broad cross-section of respondents, I
recruited participants from New Mexico State Motor Division (MVD) field office
waiting rooms in the greater Albuquerque/Rio Rancho, New Mexico metropolitan
area. Most New Mexican adults maintain drivers’ licenses that, at the time of the
interviews, required in-person renewal every four years. Many non-drivers also
renew state-issued IDs every four years to purchase alcohol, enter bars, open
bank accounts, and write and cash checks. I selected potential participants
randomly by approaching and inviting the participation of the first person to take
a number from an automatic ticket dispenser to see an MVD clerk any time I was
not already engaged with another (potential) participant. To take part,
participants had to be at least 18 years old. To compensate participants for their
time and to increase participation rates of less generous individuals who might be
less likely to offer time to a researcher and less likely to make charitable
contributions, I offered participants $25 (2017 dollars) in immediate cash upon
completing a survey.
4.2.1. Donation measures
To capture donations that people make in diverse social contexts that are
difficult to implement and control in experiments, I interviewed participants about
their donation behaviors. This permits investigation of donations that people
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make in response to appeals from real-life associates who they have enduring
social relationships with as well as donations that people make in private
contexts that their friends are unlikely to know about, and that cannot be
observed directly.
To collect data on donations, I handed participants cards that listed first, the
most common activities that charities support (see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1) and
second, the most common ways that people give to charities (see Table 3.1 in
Chapter 3). The first prompting, by causes and activities supported, assists
respondents in recalling larger donation amounts (Wilhelm, 2007), while the
second prompting, by the method of giving, helps respondents remember small
gifts that they tend to forget about when prompted only by cause (P. Rooney et
al., 2004). I informed participants that “some people give money or goods to
charitable causes, while others for a variety of good reasons choose not to give”
and prompted participants by noting that “often people who give to charity do not
give in every 12-month period”. Next, I advised participants to not be concerned if
they “did not make a donation in the specific restricted time period I am asking
about” because “the participation of non-donors is as valuable to this study as the
participation of donors in order to obtain an accurate picture of people’s giving
choices” and then asked respondents indicate the causes they supported and the
ways they gave donations over the previous 12 months.
For each separate donation participants made over the year, I asked
respondents whether they gave money or property. For monetary donations, I
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had participants report the amount, a, of each contribution. For property
donations, I asked what the item was and what the respondent would have done
with the item if it had not donated it. I omit donations of goods that participants
said they otherwise would have given elsewhere, thrown out, or stored without
using since these are often instances of people prudently removing clutter from
their lives rather than instances of people forgoing resources to benefit others.
For items that were expressly bought to donate, I had participants report the
purchase price, a, of the donated goods. For all other property donations, I asked
participants how much they would have accepted for the item at the end of the
day at a garage sale and use that amount, a, as the value of the donation.
I asked participants whether they were offered a “thank-you” gift for any of
the donations they gave. If they were offered a “thank-you” gift, I inquired about
what the gift was and asked if the donor accepted the gift. For any accepted
“thank-you” gifts, I asked participants what they did with the gift. If the respondent
or a member of the respondent’s household used, consumed, re-gifted, or
displayed the “thank-you” gift, I asked the respondent for the highest price, p,
they would have been willing to pay for the “thank-you” item in a store. I subtract
this amount, p, from the amount donated, a, to account for consumption motives
that encourage some donations. If a donor received a raffle ticket or lottery entry,
I omit the entire donation from the analysis since the hope of winning something
more valuable than the initial investment often motivates the donation more than
a desire to help.
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Since some households claim charitable deductions on their taxes and
effectively pay only (a – m) for each dollar given to charity, where a is the
donation amount and m is the household’s marginal tax rate, I asked participants
whether they itemize their taxes (i.e., use the 1040 long-form Schedule A). For
participants who itemize their taxes, I asked whether they claim a deduction for
charitable contributions and if so, to indicate which donations that we had talked
about that they would claim. I use the amount claimed on taxes, c, along with
each household’s marginal tax rate, m, as calculated with TAXSIM (Feenberg &
Coutts, 1993) from demographic information the respondents reported in private
questionnaires to subtract (m * c) from each donation amount a that participants
gave.
For each donation, I also asked the participants how they learned about the
nonprofit and how to make their donation. If participants learned about a donation
opportunity from another person, I asked whether the donor knew the source
personally and if so, how. Next, I asked whether the source 1) let the donor know
about the cause without directly asking if (s)he would give or 2) asked the donor
directly if (s)he would give and wanted to know the donor’s decision. The former
indicates donations that participants give as a result of learning about a cause or
an opportunity to give from friends and associates, while the latter indicates
donations that participants give in response to social pressure from friends and
associates. The social pressure to give is amplified when a familiar associate
directly asks a potential donor if (s)he will donate or not since such requests are
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challenging to dismiss without overtly turning a requester down, and the
importance of leaving a good impression is more consequential in dealings with
familiar associates who a potential donor is likely to interact with again in the
future (see Chapter 3). I sum the total of a – [p + (m * c)] across all donations
that members of an economic household gave in response to 1) passive appeals
from familiar associates and 2) direct requests from familiar associates.
Finally, I asked participants whether anyone else was present when each
donation was made and if so, whether the donor personally knew anyone else
who was present. To measure participants’ yearly totals given without the
involvement of social ties, I sum a – [p + (m * c)] across all donations that
household members made without a familiar associate collecting, asking for, or
witnessing the contribution.
4.2.2. Social connection measures
To obtain measures of participant’s networks of close friends, I asked
participants to write down the names of any close friends they are “comfortable
socializing with and can discuss jobs, hobbies, or personal matters with” who live
within one hour’s drive from their home and who is not a relative. Next, I asked
participants to imagine themselves in a bind, such as having an important
meeting to get to and finding that their car would not start or finishing a meal at a
restaurant and finding that they did not have their wallet. I asked participants to
look at the list of friends they had named and to place a checkmark next to the
name of anyone who they were confident they could depend on to drop
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everything at that very moment to devote a couple of hours to provide a ride or
pick up a meal tab if needed. At the time of the interviews, ridesharing apps such
as Uber and Lyft were not operating in Albuquerque. If a respondent objected to
both scenarios (e.g., “I don’t have a car” or “I would call a cab if my car wouldn’t
start” and “I would dine and dash if I didn’t have my wallet” or “I always keep
money hidden in my car for emergencies like this”), I asked them to imagine that
they had just been wrongly arrested and asked them to put a checkmark next to
the name of anyone they could count on to come to bail them out right now if
they were in jail.
To protect the anonymity of participants, respondents retained the list of
names and only reported counts of close friends who live within an hour’s drive
(f) and close friends they can rely on to help at a moment’s notice (h). I use the
counts of friends (h) that participants can rely on to measure each participants’
readily accessible support network. To prevent collinearity in variables, I subtract
each participant’s accessible support network count (h) from their count of total
local close friends (f) to obtain measures of each participant’s latent local
friendship network.
4.2.3. Possible confounders
Income, marriage, parenthood, education, and church participation can
each promote social interactions that invite appeals for charitable donations and
foster friendships. Age may also be associated with both charitable contributions
and social connections. Prior studies have found that donations to charity tend to
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increase with income, age, marriage, parenthood, education, and religious
involvement (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Wiepking & Bekkers, 2012). Individuals
with higher incomes and college educations also tend to know more people
(Zheng et al., 2006) while church participation connects households to social
support networks (Ellison & George, 1994; Jackson et al., 1995). Meanwhile,
individuals over age 65 tend to know fewer people (Zheng et al., 2006).
To control for these possible confounders, participants reported their
income, year of birth, marital status, number of dependents, education, and
religious involvement on questionnaires following the interviews. To capture
household discretionary spending budgets, I estimated each household’s federal
and state income tax liabilities with TAXSIM (Feenberg & Coutts, 1993) and
computed each participants’ log of after-tax household income. I code
participants as “religious” if the respondent attends religious services at least
once a month and reports feeling at least “somewhat involved in a religious
community” or attends religious services at least once every other month and
reports feeling “very involved in a religious community.”
4.2.4. Analysis
To investigate the role of friends in encouraging people to give donations, I
analyze the yearly totals that participants give to charity in response to appeals
from familiar associates as a function of the size of a participant’s readily
accessible support network, local latent friend network, and controls for the
possible confounders outlined above in Section 4.2.3. I separately examine the
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totals that participants give in response to passive appeals from familiar
associates and the totals that participants give in response to direct requests
from familiar associates to disentangle the influence that familiar associates may
have in increasing an individual’s awareness of good causes and the impact that
familiar associates may have in generating social pressure to give. To account
for zero-inflation stemming from households that did not make any donations in
response to appeals from social ties, I model donations using Cragg’s (1971)
double-hurdle approach to separately estimate 1) a probit model of a whether an
economic household made any donations in response to appeals from known
associates and 2) a truncated normal model of the amount an economic
household gave in response to appeals from known associates (with a correction
for the correlation in errors). Two-stage approaches have been shown to
outperform tobit specifications in modeling charitable contributions since the
decision of whether to give and how much to give are likely separate decisions
that need not depend on the same predictors to the same degree (Forbes &
Zampelli, 2010; Petrovski, 2017). I choose Cragg’s (1971) two-stage approach
over a Heckman (1979) two-stage approach because 1) I seek to understand the
actual amounts that households give in response to direct requests from known
associates rather than probable giving levels if all households were to give in
response to direct requests from known associates and 2) there are two hurdles
that may keep participants from giving in response to direct requests from known
associates. Participants may turn down direct requests from known associates or
they may not receive direct request from known associates over the course of a
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year. Since the double-hurdle model makes a normality assumption, I account for
the long right tail in the distribution of giving totals by applying a natural log
transformation of donation amounts. The Box-Cox correction (Box & Cox, 1964)
lambdas for the totals economic households gave in response to appeals from
familiar associates, ג, fall within the range of -0.1 and 0.0 indicating that natural
log transformations of donation amounts approximate normal distributions for
these data.
To investigate whether more generous people receive more social
investment from others, I model the size of participants’ friendship networks as a
function of the total amount that participants gave to charity without any known
associates collecting, asking for, or witnessing the donation and controls for the
possible confounders described in Section 4.2.3. Since increased social
investment may manifest as a set number of friends who are more willing to
invest, more friends who are willing to invest at all, or both, I model both the size
of participants’ readily accessible helping networks and the size of their latent
local networks. Given that the dependent variables here are counts and the data
are over-dispersed (in the sense that the standard deviations are greater than the
means), I use negative binomial count models that introduce an additional
dispersion parameter to account for disparity in the variance and the mean
number of friends respondents report. Negative binomial count models tend to be
more efficient and produce more accurate standard errors and test statistics than
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bootstrap, jackknife, and other after-the-fact correction methods that seek to
account for over-dispersion (Allison, 2009).
4.3. Results
The analysis that follows is based on survey data from 494 households that
reported all variables of interest. I present summary statistics in Table 4.1
(below). 90.85% of participants have at least one close friend in the community
and 86.48% report at least one close friend who can be counted on as a helper in
a time of need. On average, participants have 5.99 close friends in the
community, 4.18 of whom can be counted on in a time of need.
Just over half of participants, 51.98%, gave at least one donation in
response to an unrelated familiar associate’s indirect or passive appeal. After
subtracting out tax subsidies, donations of unwanted property, and purchases of
charity goods and raffle tickets, participants expended a mean of $1,158.22 ±
$1,944.83 and a median of $315.00 on causes that they learned about from a
friend or acquaintance who did not put the donor on the spot to provide a
response to the request. A smaller number of participants, 42.06%, gave at least
one donation in response to a direct request from a familiar associate. These
participants expended a mean of $287.81 ± $1,169.69 and a median of $31.00 in
response to direct requests from familiar associates, after subtracting out tax
subsidies, donations of unwanted property, and purchases of charity goods and
raffle tickets. Most respondents, 61.13%, gave at least one donation over the
year without any familiar associates or extra-household relatives collecting,
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics
Percent of
participants
>0
Control variables
Age
Number of dependents
After-tax income
Churchgoer (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no)
4-year college degree (1 = yes, 0 = no)

Mean

Std. dev.

42.63
0.78
$62,517

15.14
1.1
$58,301

86.48
43.74

4.18
1.81

6.01
4.35

90.85

5.99

8.13

40.56
49.8
26.84

Social support
Number of readily accessible helpers
Number of latent close friends
Total number of close friends residing within 1
hour's drive
Charitable donations
Dollars donated in response to indirect appeals
from familiar associates
Dollars donated in response to direct requests
from familiar associates
Dollars donated without social pressure

51.98

$1,158.22

$1,944.83

42.06

$287.80

$1,169.69

61.13

$486.33

$1,487.93

requesting, or directly witnessing the contribution. These respondents expended
a mean of $486.33 ± $1,487.93 and a median of $68.29 over the year without
any familiar associates outside the household having first-hand knowledge of the
gift, after subtracting out tax subsidies, donations of unwanted property, and
purchases of charity goods and raffle tickets. Although the charitable
expenditures reported here after subtracting out tax subsidies, transfers of
unwanted property, purchases of “thank-you” premiums, and investments in
raffles and lotteries are relatively small for most households, great variation
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exists with some households giving quite substantial amounts. I am interested in
exploring how this variation relates to variation in the size of the participants’
friendship networks and the amount of social support they receive.
4.3.1. Generosity elicited by friends
I use double hurdle models to examine the totals that participants expend in
response to appeals from familiar associates. The goal here is to investigate
whether people with more friends give more to charity because they receive
more requests to give and acquire more information about good causes through
their more extensive social networks. Table 4.2 (below) examines the totals that
participants expend in response to indirect and passive appeals from familiar
associates, while Table 4.3 (below) examines the totals that participants expend
in response to direct requests from familiar associates. The participation
estimates measure the effect a given variable has on the probability that a
participant gives at least one donation. The expenditure estimates show the
effect of a given variable on the log amount a participant gives per year.
People with more friends are not significantly more likely than people with
fewer friends to make at least one donation in response to an appeal from a
familiar associate. This finding holds for indirect requests (see Table 4.2 below)
and the number of dependable friends (t=1.43, p=.15) and the number of local
latent friends (t=-1.48, p=.14) as well as for direct requests (see Table 4.3 below)
and the number of dependable friends (t=1.22, p=.22) and the number of local
latent friends (t=-0.12, p=.90). The number of friends a participant can name also
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Table 4.2. Donations given in response to a passive or indirect appeal from a familiar associate
Participation (52.54%)
Parameter estimate
(std. error)
t-value
Intercept
Standard deviation
Control variables
Log income
Age
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Number of dependents
4-year college degree (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Churchgoer (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Social support
Number of readily accessible helpers
Number of latent local friends
Model fit
Log-likelihood

Expenditure
Parameter estimate
(std. error)

t-value

-2.851 (0.868)

-3.287**

-1.919 (0.364)
0.348 (0.015)

-5.277***
22.760***

0.187 (0.845)
0.010 (0.004)
-0.010 (0.142)
0.027 (0.063)
0.159 (0.150)
1.078 (0.132)

2.210*
2.229*
-0.072
0.43
1.067
8.147***

0.14 0 (0.034)
0.004 (0.002)
-0.011 (0.054)
0.011 (0.022)
0.042 (0.051)
0.334 (0.047)

4.070***
2.459*
-0.208
0.483
0.817
7.089***

0.018 (0.012)
-0.021 (0.014)

1.435
-1.485

0.002 (0.004)
0.002 (0.004)

-380.81 on 19 degrees of freedom

. Significant at the .10 level, * Significant at the .05 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, *** Significant at the
.001 level
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0.459
0.383

Table 4.3. Donations given in response to a direct request from a familiar associate
Participation (43.00%)
Parameter estimate
(std. error)
t-value
Intercept
Standard deviation
Control variables
Log income
Age
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Number of dependents
4-year college degree (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Churchgoer (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Social support
Number of readily accessible helpers
Number of latent local friends
Model fit
Log-likelihood

Expenditure
Parameter estimate
(std. error)

t-value

-3.384 (0.867)

-3.905***

-1.064 (0.671)
0.571 (0.028)

-1.585
20.591***

0.228 (0.084)
-0.0003 (0.004)
-0.093 (0.137)
0.086 (0.059)
0.188 (0.141)
0.017 (0.125)

3.339***
-0.074
-0.674
1.45
1.338
1.373

0.083 (0.066)
-0.001 (0.003)
0.107 (0.091)
0.006 (0.039)
0.166 (0.093)
-0.054 (0.085)

1.26
-0.278
1.176
0.163
1.785.
-0.632

0.014 (0.011)
-0.002 (0.014)

1.215
-0.122

0.022 (0.007)
-0.001 (0.007)

3.302***
-0.195

-502.55 on 19 degrees of freedom

. Significant at the .10 level, * Significant at the .05 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, *** Significant at the .001
level
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does not predict how much participants expend in response to indirect and
passive charitable donation appeals made by friends and associates (see Table
4.2 above). This finding also holds for both the number of dependable friends
(t=0.46, p=.65) and the number of local latent friends (t=0.38, p=.70). However,
people who name more readily accessible helpers tend to expend larger totals in
response to direct requests from familiar associates (t=3.30, p<.001) (see Table
4.3 above). No similar effect occurs with an increasing number of close friends
that respondents do not believe can be counted on in a time of need (t=-0.19,
p=.85). These results indicate that simply having more close friends does not
correlate with increased giving in response to information and requests from
familiar associates. But, naming more close friends who can be counted on to
drop everything at a moment’s notice to help does correspond with larger
expenditures in response to direct requests from friends. This finding may
indicate that friends who are more willing and able to help make more direct
requests and exert more social pressure to give. Alternatively, people who turn
down direct requests from familiar associates with more regularity may have
fewer friends willing to invest in social relationships with them. Either scenario
indicates a cost of maintaining readily accessible helping networks.
4.3.2. Friends drawn in by generosity
I use negative binomial count models to examine whether people who are
more generous independent of social pressure and requests to give from familiar
associates report more social investment from their peers. Table 4.4 panel A
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(below) examines the total number of local close friends a participant could
name. The independent variable measuring charitable giving in these models
represents participants’ log expenditure on charity over a year without the firsthand knowledge of any friends, acquaintances, or extended family members.
Participants’ total expenditures on charitable giving independent of social
pressure from familiar associates do not predict the total number of friends a
participant can name who live within a one-hour drive from the participant’s home
(z=1.46, p=.14).
However, a more interesting picture emerges if we distinguish close friends who
participants identify as readily accessible helpers from latent local friends who
participants identify as unwilling or unable to help with an immediate need. In
Table 4.4 (below), panel B only counts close friends who participants named as
readily accessible helpers while panel C only counts close friends who
participants named as unavailable or unwilling to help. The total amount that
participants’ transfer to charity independent of social pressure from familiar
associates positively predicts the number of close friends a participant identifies
as dependable helpers (z=3.99, p<.001) and negatively predicts the number of
close friends a participant identifies as unreliable or unavailable to help in a time
of need (z=-2.40, p=.02). These inverse relationships indicate that those who
tend to behave more generously in situations without a clear reputational payoff
can name more friends who they believe will help them and name fewer close
friends who they believe are not dependable as helpers.
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Table 4.4. Friends in community
A. Total number of close friends

Intercept

Parameter estimate
(std. error)
0.880 (0.630)

z-value
1.396

B. Number of readily accessible
helpers
Parameter estimate
(std. error)
z-value
0.072 (0.660)
0.110

C. Number of latent local friends
Parameter estimate
(std. error)
0.816 (1.201)

z-value
0.497

Control variables
Log income

0.052 (0.064)

0.411

0.082 (0.066)

0.217

-0.024 (0.122)

0.842

Age

-0.001 (0.003)

-0.409

-0.001 (0.003)

-0.153

-0.005 (0.007)

-0.731

Married (1 = yes, 0 = no)

-0.044 (0.129)

-0.342

0.036 (0.134)

0.272

-0.312 (0.249)

-1.254

Number of adults in household

0.051 (0.115)

0.442

-0.077 (0.121)

-0.640

0.340 (0.219)

1.554

Number of dependents
4-year college degree (1 = yes,
0 = no)
Churchgoer (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Donations independent of
social pressure
Log dollars donated

0.006 (0.047)

0.123

0.083 (0.047)

1.750.

-0.233 (0.094)

-2.477*

-0.016 (0.114)

-0.136

0.010 (0.116)

0.861

-0.464 (0.229)

-2.026*

0.472 (0.096)

4.902***

0.488 (0.099)

4.925***

0.523 (0.188)

0.028 (0.019)

1.463

0.077 (0.019)

3.988***

-0.089 (0.037)

2.786**

-2.403*

Model fit
Null deviance

549.60 on 471 degrees of freedom

577.01 on 471 degrees of freedom

428.05 on 471 degrees of freedom

Residual deviance
Number of Fisher scoring
iterations
2 x log-likelihood

516.73 on 463 degrees of freedom

509.15 on 463 degrees of freedom

399.80 on 463 degrees of freedom

1

1

1

-2631.600

-2299.113

-1512.198

. Significant at the .10 level, * Significant at the .05 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, *** Significant at the .001 level
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4.3.3. Other findings
Unsurprisingly, participants who can more easily afford the cost of giving
donations as a result of earning more are more likely to give in response to an
indirect appeal from a familiar associate (t=2.21, p=.03) (see Table 4.2 above)
and in response to a direct request from a familiar associate (t=3.34, p< .001)
(see Table 4.3 above). Moreover, a 10% increase in after-tax income increases
the total participants give in response to passive appeals from known associates
by 1.4% (t=4.07, p<.001), but does not increase the total amounts that
participants give in response to direct requests from known associates (t=1.26,
p=.21) (see Table 4.2 above and Table 4.3 above). With increasing age,
respondents become more likely to donate in response to an indirect appeal from
a known associate (t=2.23, p=.03) and are more likely to give larger amounts in
response to these appeals (t=2.46, p=.01) (see Table 4.2). Religious
participation also increases the likelihood (t=8.15, p<.001) and yearly total
(t=7.09, p<.001) that participants give in response to indirect appeals from
familiar associates (see Table 4.2). Much of this giving stems from indirect
appeals that occur at religious services where an individual receives a request
from a familiar associate (such as a church leader at the pulpit), but the request
is passive (such as a collection plate passed from worshipper to worshipper)
rather than asked as a direct question addressed to one individual. Religious
participation also appears to link people to others. It is the best predictor of the
number of close friends (z=4.90, p=<.001), including both readily accessible
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helpers (z=4.93, p<.001) and local latent close friends (z=2.79, p=.01), that
residents can name who live within an hour of their home (see Table 4.4 above).
People who attend religious services more often may establish emotional support
networks through regular interactions with other congregation members (Dunbar,
2020). People with more dependents (z=-2.48, p=.01) and college degrees (z=2.03, p=.04) tend to have close friendships with fewer people that they do not
believe they can rely on to help in a time of need (see Table 4.4 above).
4.4. Discussion
The results here suggest that generosity might foster close friendships
between partners who are willing to invest in one another. This is consistent with
theory (see for instance, Alexander, 1987; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Frank et
al., 1993; Gurven et al., 2000; Hirschleifer, 1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001;
Nesse, 2007; Roberts, 1998; Sugden, 2005; Trivers, 1971; Zahavi, 1995)
suggesting that the evolution (and maintenance) or our helping sentiments derive
from the benefits of building a reputation for generosity and, consequentially, of
fostering fruitful cooperative relationships. Merely having more close friends in
the community does not correlate with increased giving levels, but the size of a
participant’s perceived readily accessible helping network does positively
correlate with the yearly totals participants give to charity both 1) in response to
direct requests from friends and acquaintances and 2) without the involvement or
first-hand knowledge of friends, acquaintances, or extra-household relatives.
People who give less money to charity without the involvement or first-hand
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knowledge of their friends, acquaintances, or extra-household relatives have
fewer close friends in the community who they believe are unreliable or unwilling
to help them in a time of need.
People who report more readily accessible helpers give larger totals to
charity in response to direct requests from friends, but not in response to indirect
and passive requests from friends. The number of local friends who respondents
believe will not or cannot help does not predict amounts given to charity, either in
response to direct requests from friends or in response to indirect and passive
requests from friends. These findings indicate that people who believe they have
more friends willing to devote a couple of hours to help with an unexpected need
are more willing to invest in their social relationships by giving more charitable
donations at the request of their friends, but also accord with less generous
individuals who need to be explicitly asked to give attracting fewer friends who
are willing to help. Either way, it indicates a cost of maintaining friendships with
dependable helpers.
People who give larger totals to charity without the first-hand knowledge of
any friends or acquaintances report fewer friends who are undependable or
unwilling to help and more friends who are willing to drop everything at a
moment’s notice to devote a couple of hours to help with an unexpected need.
This is consistent with more generous individuals receiving more social
investment from friends who seek to maintain social relationships with generous
individuals. People who give more to charity without their friends and
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acquaintances exerting social pressure may also be more likely to offer their
resources, time, labor, attention, encouragement, and emotional availability to
others in general. Here, I have measured the donations they give to charity in the
absence of social pressure from friends. They may also be more likely to leave a
larger tip, to hold the door for someone, to let someone buying one item cut in
front of them in a checkout lane, to return a found wallet with all of the cash
intact, to help push stuck cars in a snowstorm, to drop baked goods off at their
neighbor’s homes for the holidays, or to ask a friend, “how was your day—
really?” and to listen if the friend had a bad day. While donations that people give
in private and anonymous settings may sometimes be discovered by a donor’s
associates, it is more likely that the traits that make people prone to give these
donations are what make them likeable. The actual donations may be largely
unknown to the donor’s associates. Since the charitable donations here are given
outside of established long-term social relationships, the association here
between donation amounts and friends cannot be attributed to people with more
friends receiving more social pressure to give. However, these results are
consistent with people being more helpful when they believe others, in general,
are more likely to be helpful. To ultimately determine whether more generous
people receive more social investment from their friends requires confirmation
that people make accurate assessments of who among their close friends can be
depended on to help in a time of need.
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4.4.1. Implications for previous studies
Causation
Several previous studies have investigated the association of people’s
social relationships and their donations to charity, but none to my knowledge
have considered an evolutionary perspective. Previous studies examining the
association of social relationships and charitable donations have been based in
the assumption that social relationships determine charitable donation patterns
(see for example, Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2008; E. Brown & Ferris, 2007;
Bryant et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2002; Leonard et al., 2010; Putnam, 1995; L.
Wang & Graddy, 2008; Wiepking & Maas, 2009). Evolutionary theory and results
of the present study, however, suggest that the level of generosity that
individuals express is as likely to influence the composition of their social
relationships as to be an outcome of the composition of their social relationships.
The findings that people who give more to charity tend to have more empathic
concern (Wiepking & Maas, 2009) and tend to trust others more (Brooks, 2005;
E. Brown & Ferris, 2007; Wiepking & Maas, 2009) may be causes rather than
outcomes of people’s richer social networks. People who report more friends that
can be counted on to help with an unexpected need give larger donation totals in
response to direct appeals from friends and acquaintances, but do not give more
in response to indirect or passive appeals from friends and associates sharing
information about charitable causes. This indicates that having more friends is
associated with charitable giving not because people with more friends learn
about more good causes, but because people with more friends—particularly
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friends who can be relied upon—face more social pressure to give. People who
give more to charity independent of any information and social pressure from
their friends and acquaintances have more friends who can be relied upon and
fewer friends who cannot be relied upon. This indicates that the association
between charitable giving and measures of social ties arises independently of
any requests and information that social ties provide about charitable causes.
The evidence implies, instead, that people who are more likely to give to charity
and more likely to be liked and treated well by friends. Of course, this analysis is
based on self-report data, so an alternative interpretation is that people who
believe that others are more likely to help them give more to charity. Future work
is needed to distinguish these possible interpretations of the results presented
here.
Partner choice
The positive relationship found in the present study between people’s levels
of generosity and the levels of social investment they give and receive are also
consistent with theories of partner choice that suggest that more generous
individuals are likely to assort with other similarly generous social partners
(Barclay, 2013; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; McNamara et al., 2008; Roberts,
1998). Biological market theory (Barclay, 2013; Noë & Hammerstein, 1995)
draws attention to the fact that individuals should vary in their appeal as
cooperative partners in accord with their degree of generosity. If individuals
appraise the comparative generosity of multiple associates and can selectively
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court any benevolent standouts for friendships, partner choice can result (Hardy
& Van Vugt, 2006; Roberts, 1998). Partner choice promotes cooperation in
theoretical models (C. A. Aktipis, 2004; Ashlock et al., 1996; McNamara et al.,
2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994; Sherratt & Roberts, 1998; Vanberg &
Congleton, 1992; Yamagishi et al., 1994) and among participants in economics
experiments (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Chiang, 2010; Coricelli et al., 2004; Hardy &
Van Vugt, 2006; Milinski et al., 2002b; T. Page et al., 2005; Rand et al., 2011;
Seinen & Schram, 2006; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010; J. Wang et al., 2012). If
partner choice is mutual, very generous individuals are likely to choose one
another as friends; leaving less generous individuals to pair with similarly less
generous partners. Positive assortment of social partners of like generosity has
been found in economic experiments involving strangers (T. Page et al., 2005;
Sylwester & Roberts, 2010), real-life acquaintances and friends (Leider et al.,
2009; Pradel et al., 2009), and traditional foragers in a small-scale society
(Apicella et al., 2012). However, in the last case positive assortment is argued to
result from people adhering to norms of those they interact with and not from
partner choice (K. M. Smith et al., 2018).
Since I don’t have information on how generous participant’s friends are
beyond their reported willingness to devote a couple of hours to help the
participant, I find evidence that is consistent, but insufficient to conclude that
partner choice leads to the positive assortment of friends of like generosity.
People may be more (or less) willing to help a friend who is relatively generous

143

(or selfish) without themselves being more generous (or selfish) than the average
person. Further, people who report more close friends that can be counted on in
a time of need report giving more donations in response to direct requests from
friends and acquaintances, but not in response to indirect and passive appeals
from friends and acquaintances. This suggests that the association between
charitable giving and social support from friends does not result because people
who seek out ways to support their friends by giving charitable donations
establish friendships with more generous peers. Rather, the results here are
more consistent with the idea that people who are more willing to respond to a
direct request from a friend with an excuse or a flat refusal have fewer friends
willing to invest in a social relationship with them. Indeed, the cost of appearing
selfish and loosing social investment may play a larger role in human cooperation
than the benefit of appearing hypergenerous to attract social investment. After
all, indiscriminately generous individuals may attract attention not only from
beneficient exchange partners, but also from cadgers looking for easy marks.
4.4.2. Limitations and caveats
While individuals certainly foster cooperative relationship through charitable
donations sometimes and certainly deter cooperative relationships by turning
down charitable requests sometimes, I am not suggesting that people have
perfect knowledge of one another’s donations or even that people use charitable
giving as the primary way to assess one another’s generosity. Charitable giving
is just one of many culturally specific behaviors that arise from reputational
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concerns and other-regarding sentiments. Individuals who routinely turn down
friends and acquaintances who directly ask for support of a cause likely resist
social pressure to act kindly in numerous situations that their associates and
peers sometimes observe, infer, or hear about through gossip. Meanwhile, those
who give more freely even when known associates are unlikely to discover a
donation probably behave generously more often in many other contexts that
also lack a clear short-term payoff. While most of these acts will remain unknown
to a helper’s friends, the small sampling that become known can increase a
helper’s value as a (potential) cooperative partner. Indeed, kind acts undertaken
without a clear reputational pay-off may be the most effective for garnering the
trust of (potential) cooperative partners.
Since members of households often share finances and expenses, some
couples make donation decisions, especially those involving larger gifts, jointly.
Couples allocating money from a common “pot” may make giving decisions
together that differ from the decisions that either would make on their own.
Partners may also maintain separate social support networks from one another.
To the extent that a participant’s giving decisions do not reflect their own choices,
but their social support networks do, measures of charitable giving and support
networks may be unrelated. While this presents a complication to the present
analysis, any disconnect between donation behavior and support networks
should work against, rather than for, the findings reported here.
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Charitable giving is likely to be correlated with, but not a determinate of how
much time, talent, and resources an individual is willing to invest in close friends.
Some people likely have personal reasons for not giving much, if anything, to
charity while otherwise behaving very generously in a wide array of contexts and
situations which indicate their willingness to help others. Some people who invest
heavily in their friends but do not contribute much to common goods may even
be more appealing as friends than people who are generous to friends but also
squander some resources on common goods that could be invested directly into
friendships instead. Meanwhile, some charitable donations may be given for
reasons that have little to do with helping others. For instance, large public
donations of sums well beyond the means of an ordinary donor can mark an elite
donor’s social position and prestige (Boone, 1998; Glazer & Konrad, 1996;
Ostrower, 1997).
Generosity is also certainly only one of many characteristics on which
people rate one another as (potential) friends. Some less generous individuals
likely attract friends by virtue of great charisma, physical beauty, or control over
an important commodity. People also select friends with compatible personalities,
shared interests, shared opinions, and shared values. Additionally, factors such
as time in a community, neighborhood structure, and profession can influence
the composition of our friendships. Any of these other endearing traits can lead
friends to invest in maintaining a social relationship with someone. However, the
central question that informed the present research was to determine whether
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evolutionary theories can account for charitable giving behavior—not to
determine the best determinates of an individual’s appeal as a friend. Still, the
fact that factors other than those considered here influence how much people
give to charity and the composition of their social networks only dilutes the
relationship I have found here, making the findings of the present study even
more striking.
The biggest limitation of the present study is that it relies on people’s selfreports of their number of readily accessible helpers, total number of close
friends in the community, and donations to charity. Yet, our understanding of
human cooperation requires studies that employ many types of data and
methods since each study has its own shortcomings. Experimental studies
provide valuable insights by allowing researchers to observe behaviors and
control key variables, but the artificial nature of experiments can cast doubt on
inferences we draw from them regarding the very behaviors we seek to explain
that occur outside the lab (Gurven & Winking, 2008; Levitt & List, 2007; Tognetti
et al., 2012; Winking & Mizer, 2013). Experimental studies of cooperation
routinely examine very short-term effects in undergraduate students facing forced
allocation decisions involving windfall earnings in limited interactions with
strangers. The present study investigates the relationship between 1) a realworld behavior that informs many of the theories that artificial lab experiments
seek to understand, namely voluntary charitable donations of earned money, and
2) social investments in and social support obtained from long-term personally
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chosen friends among a diverse sample of adults. The trade-off of this is that I
cannot control key variables and I face challenges of recall and social desirability
biases. My hope is that both approaches complement one another. I find that
more generous donors have friendships with more contacts who they believe
they can count on in a time of need. Meanwhile, subjects who give more in public
goods games are more often paired through mutual partner choice with generous
partners for economic games (Sylwester & Roberts, 2010) and when given the
choice of partners for experimental economic tasks, subjects prefer those who
have previously displayed generosity by cooperating with third parties (Barclay &
Willer, 2007; Chiang, 2010) or by contributing to a common pool (Hardy & Van
Vugt, 2006; T. Page et al., 2005; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). Taken together,
the evidence suggests that reputation motivates generosity and plays a role in
cooperative partnerships.
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CHAPTER 5. THE NATURE OF CHARITABLE GIVING

The best recreation is to do good
— William Penn, No Cross, No Crown
5.1. Recap
This dissertation draws on an evolutionary perspective to advance our
understanding of the adaptive functions behind charitable giving behavior. When
I first envisioned this research project, I thought charitable giving mostly
amounted to donors handing over their hard-earned money in private and
anonymous contexts to enhance the welfare of strangers. I sought to increase
our general understanding of cooperative behaviors that are not readily explained
by indirect fitness benefits, by-product mutualism, reciprocity, or direct
reputational gain from an individual-selectionists perspective by investigating a
behavior that I thought rarely involved interactions with anyone the donor knew
personally. Instead, I found that charitable giving is much more like other
exchanges and favors that transpire among friends and acquaintances than I had
imagined.
People give charitable donations for any the same reasons they give any
other form of help. Sometimes, people give to alleviate the need of strangers.
Sometimes, people give to support relatives with personal stakes in a cause.
Much more often, however, people give in social settings where familiar social
ties solicit, collect, or are present to potentially observe the donor’s contributions
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first-hand. People give at local church services where they might want to
demonstrate that they are not free riding on the services the church provides.
People give at work where they might want to show that they are productive
members of the team. Some donations even involve direct investments in social
relationships with friends and acquaintances who have a personal stake in a
cause. The extent to which donations occur in social settings involving peers who
interact with a donor on a regular enough basis for a donor to benefit from their
regard and trust suggests that benefits from building social reputation play an
important role in the evolution and maintenance of human personality traits,
sentiments, emotions, and values that encourage charitable giving.
5.2. Popular conceptions of charitable giving versus reality
Charitable giving epitomizes the striking nature of human cooperation when
people give donations in private and anonymous social contexts to enhance the
welfare of strangers. The scale, breadth, and intensity of human cooperative
behaviors present a puzzle for models of self-interest. People across diverse
cultures and ecologies assist others in ways that indirect fitness benefits,
reciprocity, and by-product mutualism cannot easily explain. In large-scale
societies where interactions routinely involve strangers, people sometimes give
up their seats for others, let shoppers with fewer items cut in front of them in
checkout lanes, give money to panhandlers, and leave tips at restaurants. More
impressively, some people turn found valuables over to lost and founds, dig out
stuck cars in snowstorms, stop to help stranded motorists on the side of the road,
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and give charitable donations in private and anonymous settings. Most
impressively, whistleblowers risk their livelihoods to expose corruption and public
dangers while heroes and heroines take life-threatening risks to save strangers in
peril. These behaviors may have parallels to helping acts in small-scale societies
that are not directed at any single beneficiary. For example, community members
construct and maintain village commons, hosts provide and prepare public
feasts, trekkers clear trails for those who will come along behind them, foragers
pursue widely shared resources, and warriors risk their lives to defend their
communities.
At the outset of this project, I pictured charitable giving as people mailing off
checks or entering payment information online from the privacy of their homes to
assist strangers. When practiced this way, charitable giving epitomizes the
striking nature of human cooperation. Such donations involve people turning over
their hard-earned money to enhance the welfare of strangers. Unlike most forms
of aid-giving that involve direct interactions between helpers and recipients,
donors and beneficiaries do not even know one another’s identity when
donations are relayed through intermediary charitable organizations. As a result,
these donors cannot expect recompensation from those they help. These donors
also cannot anticipate preferential treatment should they ever need a charity’s
services. Donations given in private and anonymous settings to charities that do
not announce the identities of contributors also cannot directly enhance a donor’s
reputation.
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By studying what, at the outset, I envisioned as generosity that does not
help or impress social partners who may repay favors, I sought to advance our
general understanding of why people across diverse cultures and ecologies
sometimes engage in beneficent behaviors that are not directed at any particular
recipient but instead seem intended to enhance general welfare. However, as
soon as I began interviewing people about the charitable requests they
encounter and the charitable donations they give (if any), I quickly discovered
that charitable giving is more like other forms of aid-giving than I had imagined
and is often deeply embedded in social relationships. Although impersonal media
appeals, appeals made by representatives of nonprofits, and requests to help
strangers in need account for most of the charitable appeals that people hear or
see, people rarely give in response to these commonplace requests that only put
their social reputations with familiar contacts at minimal stake. Most donations
that people give transpire in social settings where familiar social ties solicit,
collect, or are present to potentially witness the contributions. Donors even often
hand over charitable donations to friends and acquaintances with personal
stakes in the cause the donor supports. When people do give donations that
friends and associates are unlikely to discover, the donations tend to involve
transfers of unwanted property, purchases of wanted charity premiums or charitybranded products, entries in games of chance, and tax subsidies that offset the
cost of giving to a greater degree than when donations are given in social
contexts involving familiar associates. Still, people who report giving larger totals
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in private and anonymous settings after the removal of economic incentives also
report more friends who can be counted on in a time of need.
The cognitions, sentiments, and values that prompt people to give
charitable contributions did not arise specifically to encourage people to give
charitable donations. Rather, charitable giving likely results from people’s
evolved proximate mechanisms that encourage expenditures of resources and
effort in general in socio-ecological settings where helpers through time have
repeatedly realized fitness-correlated payoffs. As a result, I probably should have
not been surprised to find that people give (or withhold) charitable donations for
any of the same reasons that they transfer other goods and services and do so in
many different circumstances for different reasons. In this respect, charitable
giving demonstrates the striking nature of human cooperation not by epitomizing
an extreme form of generosity but by reflecting the diversity of reasons that
people help others.
5.3. The extent of charitable giving
Most participants, over 90%, reported making at least one transfer of
money or property to charitable causes over the previous 12 months. Participants
who reported giving reported transferring a median of over 1% of their disposable
income to charity. Of course, some donations involve prudent reductions of
clutter, purchases of products sold by nonprofits, and entries in games of chance.
Some people also receive generous tax deductions that effectively subsidize
some of the cost of donations that they deduct. In total, transfers of unwanted
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property, purchases of wanted products, entries in games of chance, and tax
subsidies account for 38% of the value of respondent’s transfers to charity. After
removing these economic incentives, just under 90% of respondents are left
making at least one expenditure to support charitable causes over the course of
a year. These respondents reported expending slightly less than 1% of their
disposable income on charity.
5.4. Need
People respond to a recipients degree of need (Bickman & Kamzan, 1973;
Cappelen et al., 2013), as early as age five (Engelmann et al., 2016; Malti et al.,
2016; Paulus, 2014; Sabato & Kogut, 2018), and across many cultural contexts
(Allen-Arave et al., 2008; Aspelin, 1979; Cadelina, 1982; Gervais, 2017; Gurven
et al., 2004; D. Smith et al., 2018). This holds for charitable giving. When a
charitable appeal seeks aid for beneficiaries who need food, shelter, clothing, or
basic medical care due to poverty, natural disasters, or pressing health needs, a
potential donor can be 2 to over 2 ½ times more likely to give. Although this is a
substantial increase, the likelihood of most people giving in response to a media
appeal to help others in need ranges from only 8% to 24% for most participants.
Across the entire sample population, less than 1% of people would be more likely
to give than not in response to a given appeal to assist others with dire needs.
People do sometimes give to help others in need, but they give much more often
when they have a personal connection with a requester.
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5.5. Kinship
Emotions that encourage investments in indirect fitness can prompt
donations to support relatives who have personal stakes in causes. Such
donations occur, but rarely. Few charitable requests come from relatives and
only 11% of participants report making at least one expenditure to support
relatives with personal stakes in a cause. A median of less than 1% of the dollars
that participants transfer or expend on charity go to causes that relatives have
personal stakes in. Donations that benefit kin often involve donors purchasing
premiums to support activities that engage their grandchildren, nieces, or
nephews. As predicted by inclusive-fitness theory, decision-makers in
households that transfer resources to nonprofits in support of relatives with
personal stakes in a cause are significantly older than decision-makers in
households that do not give to nonprofits that benefit relatives.
5.6. Network giving
Donors give most of their donations in social settings where familiar social
ties solicit, collect, or are present to observe the donor’s contributions firsthand.
This suggests that the benefits of maintaining a reputation for unselfishness in
the eyes of potential future interaction partners plays an important role in the
evolution and maintenance of human personality traits, sentiments, emotions,
and values that encourage charitable giving. A reputation as a capable and
willing helper—or at least avoidance of a reputation as a free-rider—may be
necessary to establish and maintain fruitful relationships with trusting social
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partners. In this sense, charitable giving is more like other exchanges and favors
that occur among familiar associates than is commonly recognized.
Donors commonly give during social gatherings, neighborly visits,
workplace fund drives, hobby group meetings, and religious services at local
churches where familiar associates are present to collect or observe the donor’s
contribution. The best single predictor of the likelihood that a potential donor will
give in response to an appeal for a charitable donation is the presence of a social
relationship between a requester and a potential donor. Potential donors can be
5 to 11 times more likely to donate when a familiar associate, rather than a
stranger, makes an appeal. Over 20% of the study population is more likely to
give than not if a friend or acquaintance presents a passive charitable appeal. If a
request comes from a familiar associate who asks for an overt response to the
request, most people are more likely than not to give.
Nearly 8 out of 10 participants report making at least one transfer of money
or property to a charitable cause that a friend or acquaintance collected or was
present to observe first-hand. Of the totals these participants transferred to
charity, a median of 61% (IQR = 14% - 94%) of the dollars they transferred to
charity where given in such social contexts. Relatively few charitable donations
given in social contexts where familiar associates collect or observe the transfer
involve purchases of charity products, entries in games of chance, or transfers of
unwanted property. With these transfers and tax deductions removed, over 7 out
of 10 participants are left making at least one charitable expenditure that a friend
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or associate collects or is present to observe. A larger median share, 85% (IQR =
19% - 100%), of the dollars that these participants report expending on charity
are given in social contexts where friends and associates collect or are present to
observe the donation.
Each friendship a person has introduces more occasions for a friend to
make an appeal for a donation on behalf of a charitable cause. The maintenance
of close relationships with friends who can truly be relied upon may often require
warmth and kind deeds in return. Respondents who report more close friends
living in the community do not give more to charities that they learn about
through familiar associates, but the size of a participant’s readily accessible
helping network does positively correlate with the yearly totals participant’s
expend on charity in response to direct, but not passive, requests from familiar
associates. Whether friends who are more willing and able to help make more
direct requests and exert more social pressure to give or those who are more
likely to give when associates make direct requests receive more social
investment from their friends, this indicates that donations given in response to
requests from friends may help sustain readily accessible helping networks.
5.7. Donations as investments in social relationships
People also give some donations in response to solicitations from friends
and acquaintances who have personal stakes in a cause. Youth extracurricular
activities, emotional support groups, veterans’ organizations, disease research
organizations, civil rights organizations, and religious projects often recruit

157

stakeholders to collect donations from their friends and acquaintances. Such
donations are not direct reciprocity per se since the collector does not keep the
donation but bundles together several donations that are handed over to a
nonprofit for the benefit of all stakeholders in the cause. Yet, sentiments that
evolved to promote giving assistance to reciprocal helping partners likely
encourage giving when a friend with a personal stake in a cause makes a
request. Presumably, feelings of warmth toward friends promote such giving
without any desire for prospective returns (see Frank, 1988; Hruschka, 2010).
Even among more distant acquaintances, a donation collected by a familiar
associate with a personal stake in a cause can foster a social relationship by
indicating a donor’s care for the stakeholder. Conversely, a decision to ignore or
turn down a request from a familiar associate with a personal stake in a cause
risks harming the social relationship by creating an impression of a lack of care
for the stakeholder.
Most people are more likely than not to give a donation when a familiar
associate with a personal stake in a cause makes an appeal. The median
likelihood of giving in response to such a request is 67% with an interquintile
range of 54% to 79%. If a familiar associate with a personal stake in a cause
asks for a direct response to an appeal, most people have over an 89%
probability of giving. Over half of respondents, nearly 6 in 10, report at least one
transfer to charity in response to an appeal from a familiar associate with a
personal stake in the cause. These participants report that a median of 11% (IQR
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= 0 – 64%) of the dollars they transfer to charity are collected by someone with a
personal stake in the cause who the donor knows personally. Removing
purchases of wanted charity products, entries in games of chance, and donations
of unwanted property leaves over half of households making an expenditure to
support a friend or acquaintance with a personal stake in a cause. An even larger
share of participant’s donation dollars go to support friends and acquaintances
when we raise the bar to only include donations above and beyond personal
economic incentives. A median of 18% (IQR = 0% - 82%) of the dollars that
donors expend on charity are given in response to appeals from familiar
associates who have personal stakes in the supported causes.
5.8. Extra-network giving
Over 7 out of 10 respondents also report making at least one transfer to
support charitable causes over the course of a year in settings where no friends,
acquaintances, or extra-household relatives solicit, collect, or witness the transfer
first-hand. These transfers account for a median of 27% (IQR = 2% - 75%) of the
dollars that donors transfer to charity. While such giving comprises a fair share of
transfers to charity, when we narrow our focus to donations that involve an
expenditure beyond transfers of unwanted property, purchases of wanted charity
branded products, entries in games of chance, and tax subsidies, we find that a
median share of only 8% (IQR = 0 – 68%) of the dollars that donors expend on
charity are given without someone the donor knows personally collecting,
requesting, or being present to potentially witness the gift. These donations often

159

involve donors giving small donations from their purses or pockets in response to
a request. Yet, over a quarter of respondents who report making any charitable
expenditure over the course of a year expend the larger portion of their
contribution dollars in social settings where friends and acquaintances are
unlikely to gain first-hand knowledge of the contribution. People who are moved
by feelings of sympathy and compassion to help others even when reputational
gains are unlikely may attract social investment from peers who seek such
qualities in their social partners. When friends detect generosity that is given
without any apparent immediate return, they can have more confidence in the
helper’s propensity or mindset to willingly and reliably help—especially when the
generosity is only revealed by happenstance (Alexander, 1987; Frank, 1988;
Trivers, 1971, p. 51). Consistent with this, people who are more willing to give
donations even when a gift is unlikely to impress associates report more friends
who are willing to offer assistance in a time of need. However, another possibility
is that people who are more willing to believe that their friends will help them may
be more willing to help others in situations where their friends are unlikely to
know about their generosity.
5.9. Promising avenues for future research
This dissertation research documents the importance of social relationships
in the day-to-day charitable gifts that people give. Since we often envision
charitable giving as occurring in isolated, private settings with donors having no
personal interaction with those they help, the social contexts in which people give
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their donations have been largely ignored by researchers. When social contexts
have been considered, studies have almost exclusively involved economic and
psychology experiments that, by design, involve participants interacting over
limited timescales with strangers. Yet, charitable requests and donations often
transpire during neighborly visits, social gatherings, club meetings, religious
services, and in the workplace where (potential) donors face familiar social ties.
There are good reasons to think that people will behave differently with strangers
than with familiar social ties. Individuals who can anticipate reoccurring social
interactions should be more likely to look long-range than to calculate the costs
and benefits of a finite series of interactions. People should also be more
concerned about the impressions they leave with a familiar social tie than those
they leave with a stranger since impressions left with familiar social ties can
inform and influence a person’s broader social reputation through word of mouth
given that friends often have friends in common, neighbors will have neighbors in
common, and co-workers will have co-workers in common. Reputation should be
very pertinent in interactions between friends, neighbors, coworkers, and
acquaintances but may not matter as much for interactions with strangers in a
lab. Indeed, building a reputation to impress strangers for short-term interactions
makes no more strategic sense than cooperating directly with strangers for shortterm interactions. Future research on charitable giving should pay more attention
to the long-term social connections that this study indicates play an important
role in promoting charitable donations. A particularly interesting avenue for future
research is to explore whether donors typically make their gifts through the same
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social setting (i.e. work, church, hobby group) where they meet the friends they
can count on for help. The finding that people who give more to charity in
contexts where their social ties are unlikely to know about the donation think they
have more friends who will help them needs requires further research to
determine whether more generous people actually receive more help from
friends or whether people with more cooperative worldviews who give more in
private and anonymous contexts tend to also be more likely to believe that others
will help them.
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